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Abstract 
There is a wide agreement on the fact that a large informal economy leaves many 
individuals without social protection and reduces government’s tax revenue and social 
security contributions. However, it remains an open question what really drives 
informality, namely whether workers are simply trapped out of the formal sector or, at 
least some of them, choose it because it offers better alternatives than a formal job. The 
policy implications are clearly different in the two cases. 
 
In order to shed light on this important issue, we propose a household survey instrument 
to assess the links between informality and social protection. It can be implemented either 
through a stand-alone survey or by adding a specific module to an existing general survey 
such as the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study. After describing the 
main survey instrument, we present the results of two pilot surveys, carried out in 
Bulgaria and Colombia, to test the effectiveness of the questionnaire and improve its 
design. 
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The concept of informality has been studied extensively in the theoretical and empirical literature.1
In this literature, workers are classiﬁed as “informal” if they work in a small business, do not have a
written contract or lack aﬃliation to the mandatory social security system or work in ﬁrms who do
not comply with regulations. The deﬁnition of informality has also evolved, as also demonstrated
by the subsequent proposals made by the International Conferences of Labor Statisticians (1970,
1993, 2003). The current proposed deﬁnition by the International Labour Oﬃce (ILO) shifted the
focus from the characteristics of the activity where the worker is engaged toward the characteristics
of her job. In particular, “all remunerative work — both self-employment and wage employment —
that is not recognized, regulated or protected by existing legal or regulatory frameworks and non
remunerative work undertaken in an income-producing enterprise" (Hussmanns, 2005).
Despite the still ongoing debate on the deﬁnition of informality, there is a wide agreement on the
fact that a high level of informal activity may leave many workers un-protected from diﬀerent risks
— old age, sickness, unemployment — and reduce government’s tax revenues. Further, as stressed
by Schneider and Enste (2000), oﬃcial indicators of economic activity tend to be unreliable in the
presence of a large informal sector, causing diﬃculties for policy makers in setting macro policies.
An important open issue is whether informal work is the only option for people who cannot ﬁnd a
job in the formal sector or is instead chosen — at least by some — because it is considered a better
alternative to a formal job.
These two views of informality are supported by two alternative strands in the theoretical
literature. The ﬁrst regards the existence of an informal sector as the result of disequilibrium in the
formal sector. In this class of models, the introduction of wage rigidities, such as a minimum wage
above the equilibrium wage, gives rise to an informal sector of small ﬁrms where there are no wage
rigidities, for example because minimum wage rules cannot be enforced, and unlimited employment
opportunities for those who cannot ﬁnd a job in the formal sector (Rauch, 1991; Fortin et al., 1997).
This framework provides a simple explanation for the common observation that small ﬁrms tend
to be informal.
The second strand of the literature assumes that those who work in the informal sector actually
choose to do so. Models of this type are often variants of the original model of self-selection of Roy
(1951) but tend to lack a comprehensive deﬁnition of informality. Some of them focus on the choice
1 See, for example, Fields (2005) for a recent review of the theoretical labor market models, and Schneider (2005)
for a review of the empirical estimates of the size of the informal sector.
1of evading taxes but do not consider employment status, while others explain the determinants of
entrepreneurship and ﬁrm size but do not include tax evasion among the determinants.
Models focusing on tax evasion extend the seminal papers by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and
Srinivasan (1973). The main idea is that tax evasion is risky because there is a positive probability of
being detected by the ﬁscal authorities. The basic model has been extended to include labor supply
choices (Baldry, 1979; Pencavel, 1979) and repeated games with the tax authority (Reinganum and
Wilde, 1985). One problem with this type of models is that they imply very low compliance rates.
To overcome this issue, some models introduce moral costs of evasion (Benjamini and Maital, 1985)
or the provision of a public good by the government (Cowell and Gordon, 1988). Tax evasion models
are usually static and they do not account for future beneﬁts of compliance, such as old age pension
beneﬁts.
As the self-employed are entrepreneurs of small businesses, models of entrepreneurship and ﬁrm
size are useful if the informal sector is identiﬁed with self-employment. Two theoretical models of
entrepreneurship are Lucas (1978) and Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1979). In the former, entrepreneur-
ial ability varies across workers who are instead identical in terms of labor skills. In the latter,
individuals do not diﬀer in managerial or labor ability and the choice to run a business is driven
only by attitudes toward risk. Possible obstacles to self-employment are liquidity constraints (Evans
and Jovanovic, 1989) and discrimination (Borjas and Bronars, 1989).
In order to shed light on these issues, we propose a household survey instrument to assess the
linkages between informality and social protection. The instrument can be implemented either
through a stand-alone survey, or by adding a speciﬁc module to an existing general survey such as
the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study. A household survey is particularly suited
for our purposes because it provides extensive information not only on the individual, but also
on other members of her household. This is especially important, as the decision to work in the
informal sector is likely to depend on household characteristics, especially the number, and the
employment status, of the other members.
A survey on informality should pay particular attention to a number of issues that are likely to
play a key role in the choice of participating in the labor market, engaging in a self-employment
activity or seeking a dependent employment, and looking for a job with aﬃliation to social security.
In particular, attitudes toward risk and liquidity constraints are important in self-employment
choices, while opinions about the tax and social security system are important to understand
whether workers seek formal jobs and whether ﬁrms are able/willing to evade tax and/or not
2report their workers. Impatience and life expectancy are other examples of relevant variables.
A few existing surveys address some of these issues: subjective probabilities of survival are
asked in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), in the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(ELSA), and in the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE); risk aversion
and impatience are included in the Chilean Encuesta de Prevision de Riesgos Sociales (PRIESO);
and attitudes towards the welfare state are the topic of a survey carried out by Boeri et al. (2001).
However, these surveys are mainly designed for developed countries, and none of them covers all
the issues together.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the design of our basic
questionnaire on the informal sector. Since the instrument can be used also as a stand-alone survey,
some questions are quite standard both in their content and format: in what follows, we will focus
on the parts that are not. After describing the main survey instrument, we present the results of two
pilot surveys, carried out in Bulgaria and Colombia, to test the eﬀectiveness of the questionnaire
and improve its design. Section 3 describes in detail the pilot surveys and the adaptation of the
questionnaire to country-speciﬁc issues. Section 4 asks how representative are the samples of the
two pilots. Section 5 presents some descriptive results emerging from the two pilots, and Section 6
examines how results diﬀer according to informality status of respondents. Finally, Section 7 oﬀers
our concluding remarks.
2 The basic questionnaire
Our survey questionnaire focuses on three main sets of variables: (i) employment status (current
and past, including subjective information like job satisfaction) and earnings, (ii) social protection
(level of information about the system rules, current contributions, and personal attitudes toward
the system), and (iii) subjective beliefs about uncertain events, individual attitudes toward risk,
and intertemporal substitution.
The general design of the questionnaire follows the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement
Study (LSMS). Some questions closely resemble those in existing surveys, such as ECHP, SHARE,
ELSA, HRS, SHIW, and PRIESO. The last part of the questionnaire also takes into account the
survey of attitudes toward the welfare state carried out by Boeri et al..
The basic questionnaire is in English and is organized in ﬁve chapters:
1. Demographics and main household characteristics,
32. Employment status and job characteristics,
3. Social protection,
4. Time preferences, subjective beliefs and risk attitudes,
5. Attitudes towards Social Security.
The household head answers Chapter 1, whereas Chapters 2—5 are answered by all household
members aged 15+. The full survey includes all ﬁve chapters. The information in Chapter 1 and
most of the information in Chapter 2 are usually asked in standard household surveys. Thus, only
Chapters 3—5 are relevant if the survey is going to be an add-on to an existing survey.
The rest of this section describes the basic questionnaire, with more details on the innovative
parts of the survey. Section 3.4 describes its adaptation to the two countries, Bulgaria and Colombia,
w h e r ep i l o ts u r v e y sh a v eb e e nc a r r i e do u t .
2.1 Demographics, household characteristics and employment status
As a stand-alone survey, the ﬁrst part of the questionnaire contains rather standard questions on
demographics and household characteristics (Chapter 1), and employment status (Chapter 2).
Chapter 1 contains a household membership roster and questions on key individual characteris-
tics of the members of the household, including gender, age and schooling level (last schooling level
attended and last schooling level completed). The household head is also asked to provide infor-
mation about housing, durables and ﬁnancial wealth, together with the household’s total income
and savings.
Chapter 2 collects information on employment status, taking into account the possibility of
multiple job holding. Secondary jobs are an important issue in the study of informality. A person
could have a formal main job that oﬀers social security coverage, in fact, and a secondary job that
is totally uncovered, but oﬀers higher earnings (or more satisfaction, etc.). We begin by asking
separate questions about the main job, which is deﬁned as the one demanding more hours among
all jobs held (questions Q9—Q24). If the individual has secondary jobs, we ask some of the questions
about the most important of them (questions Q27—Q36).
The reference period is the last week, as in the World Bank’s LSMS. In Q9 (and similarly in Q27
for the second job), employment status is categorized into private employee (distinguishing between
paid with regular installments or piecework), civil servant, apprentice, self-employed and unpaid
worker in family business. Singling out the latter category is particularly important for assessing
4informality in developing countries. Q10—Q15 are about job characteristics, namely occupation,
main activity of the business or organization, usual weekly hours, weekly hours last week, monthly
earnings, workplace, and number of workers in the business or organization. Q28—Q33 ask the same
questions for the second job.
Job satisfaction can play a role in the decision of holding more than one job, being an informal
worker or seeking a new job. Thus, we ask a number of questions concerning the level of job
satisfaction of workers, including on the number of hours worked, social security beneﬁts, skills
matching, earnings, ﬂexibility, work environment and fringe beneﬁts (Q16), and the overall level
of satisfaction with the current main job (Q17). Similar questions are asked for the second job
(Q35 and Q36). Employees are asked an additional question (Q19) about the type of work contract
(permanent, short-term or no contract, main job only). The following question (Q20) is about the
motivations for working as an employee. This question is asked only for the main job. A similar
question is asked to the self-employed (Q21).
Because an important feature of informality is the lack of social security coverage, the question-
naire asks about the type of social insurance program the worker contributes to (old age, survivors,
disability, sickness and maternity, work injury and unemployment insurance).2 Separate questions
are asked for the main job (Q22) and the second job (Q34). Questions Q23 and Q24 ask the
percentage of the main job’s salary/earning currently paid as contributions for the public old age
insurance. We favor a line of questioning focusing on contributions rather than on entitlements,
because the worker may be paying contributions but may not be entitled to any pension because of
eligibility conditions. An important feature of our questionnaire is the separate analysis of the var-
ious programs included in the “social security package”. The fact that they are usually “bundled”
could be a reason for workers to be informal, if the willingness to pay for one program is more than
oﬀset by the lack of interest in others, or if the overall costs of aﬃliation is too high but workers
would be willing to contribute to only some of the components of the social security system.3
Questions Q37—Q41 are directed to respondents who are not employed and are looking for a job.
Questions Q37 and Q38 are useful to check if respondents meet the ILO criteria for unemployment,
whereas questions Q39—Q40 provide information on the type of job that the unemployed are looking
for (self- or paid employment, with or without social security coverage). Motivations for those who
2 It asks questions about mandatory contributions through the employer, voluntary contribution through a private
provider, both mandatory and voluntary or none.
3 For example, if a worker wants to have an old age insurance but is not concerned with the possibility of becoming
disabled, he may not want to pay contributions for both programs. As a consequence, he may end up contributing
to none of them.
5would accept an unprotected job are important to investigate whether informality is a voluntary
choice or a forced decision (Q41). Finally, question Q42 oﬀers a very short summary of employment
status in the past calendar year, on a monthly basis. The choice of the calendar year allows us to
have a common reference period for all interviews, also when ﬁeld work lasts for a long period. The
use of monthly employment status for the past year gives information on seasonal variations in the
type of job. Overall earnings in past calendar year are asked in question Q43.
2.2 Social protection
This chapter of the questionnaire aims at understanding the level of information individuals have
about the public social protection system — both in terms of eligibility conditions and with respect
to the way beneﬁts are calculated. If the employment status is the result of choice, then it is crucial
to know what information individuals have about the variables that enter the choice problem.
The chapter begins with a question about the total number of years of contributions to the public
social security system (Q44). It then asks if the respondent is currently receiving income from public
insurance programs, distinguishing between old age (Q45), survivors (Q48) and disability (Q51). If
the respondent is receiving a pension, she is asked the monthly amount (Q46, Q49, Q52) and the
year when she started receiving the beneﬁt (Q47, Q50, Q53). Question Q54 asks if the person is
receiving income from a private pension. If this is the case, the monthly amount (Q55) and the ﬁrst
year (Q56) are asked. The subsequent questions ask whether the respondent is receiving income
from sickness and maternity (Q57) or public unemployment insurance (Q59). In case of positive
answer, the monthly amount is asked (Q58 and Q60).
The level of knowledge of the social security system is assessed through a group of questions
asked to all employed individuals. The ﬁrst question (Q62) asks the respondent what she believes
the minimum age to be in order to receive the public old age insurance. To restrict the possible
answers, the respondent is asked the age requirements for an individual who contributed for 30
years. The next question (Q63) refers to the same hypothetical situation and asks what the pension
beneﬁt would approximately be for that person, retiring at 65 (or the country oﬃcial retirement
age) if a man and at 60 if a woman. All amounts and ages in this part of the questionnaire need to
be adapted to the local institutional settings. Question Q63 asks about the expected replacement
rate, namely the expected pension as a percentage of last income. In question Q64, it is asked
by how much the pension would increase if the individual were to work for additional 5 years. In
question Q65, the eligibility conditions for public disability insurance are asked. If the respondent
6is an employee, she is then asked the eligibility conditions for sickness and maternity beneﬁts (Q67
and Q68), for work injury beneﬁts (Q71) and for unemployment beneﬁts (Q74). For unemployment
insurance, an additional question is asked about the amount of the beneﬁt (Q75). For each of these
three insurance programs, the respondent is asked if she is currently receiving the beneﬁto rh a s
received it in the last ﬁve years (Q69 and Q70, Q72 and Q73, Q76 and Q77). Needless to say, all
these questions would have to be adjusted to reﬂect country-speciﬁc institutional settings.
2.3 Subjective beliefs, time preferences and risk attitudes
Individual beliefs about uncertain events, attitudes towards risk and impatience are important in
understanding decisions related to social security coverage. Learning about individual risk attitudes
and impatience, and the role they play, is crucial to understanding informal work as a possible object
of choice.
Before asking about life expectancy, we ask respondents to self-report their health status. We
only ask two questions (Q78 and Q79) because the proposed survey is not focusing on health,
but rather on understanding whether personal health conditions may be related to aﬃliation and
attitudes towards the social security system.
We try to uncover subjective beliefs about uncertain events by asking what probabilities are
attached to them. There is strong evidence that this approach provides more reliable answers
than traditional expectation questions (Hurd and McGerry, 2002; Manski, 2004). To familiarize
respondents with this approach, the interviewer is expected to begin with the following example:
We have some questions about how likely you think various events might be. When I
ask a question I’d like you to give me a number from 0 (absolutely no chance) to 100
(absolutely certain). Let’s try an example together and start with the weather. What
do you think the chances are that it will be sunny tomorrow? You can say any number
from 0 to 100. For example, “90” would mean a 90 percent chance of sunny weather
(i.e. sunny weather is very likely).
The subjective probability of reaching a certain age is elicited by repeatedly questioning the
subject for diﬀerent ages, that can be changed according to the country’s demographics (Q80).
Question Q81 asks whether the answer is based on information by the media, on family history or
on medical records. Questions Q82—Q91 inquire about job and income expectations: standards of
living in the next ﬁve years (Q82), chances of loss of property, serious illness or accident, physical
7incapacity or death within the next 12 months (Q83), chances of receiving/leaving an inheritance
(Q84), probability of losing the job for the employees (Q86 and Q87) and of closure of the busi-
ness/bankruptcy/substantial loss of clients for the self-employed (Q88), beliefs about increase in
own income and prices in the next ﬁve years (Q89—Q91).
Questions Q92—Q105 are more speciﬁcally related to the post-retirement period. For our pur-
poses, knowing the sources of expected income is very important, as family support or ﬁnancial
assets can substitute the social security program in providing insurance. Question Q92 asks what
is the expected post-retirement pension as a percentage of current labor earnings. Questions Q93—
Q104 ask whether the individual is expecting to receive (after retirement) income from pensions of
other household members, work, properties, ﬁnancial assets, friends and relatives or other sources.
If some income is expected, the yearly amount is asked. Question Q105 is about the expected
change in living standards after retirement.
Questions Q106—Q108 elicit intertemporal preferences and give a rough measure of an individ-
ual’s discount rate. The method used is the following. Respondents are asked to imagine that they
w o nt h ep r i z eo fal o t t e r yw h i c hi sw o r t h1 0 0 0i nl o c a lc u r r e n c y . 4 The prize is certain but can be
paid only one year later. There is however the possibility of selling the ticket for 920. If they accept
920, they are not asked other questions on this topic. If they prefer 1000 one year later, they are
oﬀered 950. If they still prefer 1000 one year later, they are ﬁnally oﬀered 980. From answers to
these questions, we can deﬁne brackets for the subjective discount rate. Following Harrison et al.
(2002), the value of the ticket can be deﬁned as T = x(1 + r),w h e r er is a rate of discount. If
the respondent prefers to have T after one year, rather than x immediately, her discount rate is
smaller than r. By repeating the question for diﬀerent values of x we can identify four discount
levels.5 The set of questions could be repeated with a diﬀerent time horizon to capture variations
of the discount rate over diﬀerent time spans. As an alternative approach, it would be possible to
ask directly the amount x for which respondents would be indiﬀerent between selling and holding
the ticket. These questions are discussed in more detail in Section 5.4, where we present results
from the pilot surveys.
4 The actual amount would be country speciﬁc.
5 As noted by Frederick et al. (2002), this widespread approach assumes a linear utility function, that implies
risk neutrality. The respondent prefers T if u(x) <u (T)/(1+δ),w h e r eδ is the subjective discount rate. If the utility
function is u(x)=x
1−γ/(1 − γ),w h e r eγ is the constant relative risk aversion parameter, the choice of T implies
δ<(1 + r)
1−γ − 1 if γ<1. In the linear case, γ =0and T is chosen if δ<r . On the other hand, if respondents
are heterogeneous in γ, discount levels could be diﬀerent among people answering in the same way. One solution
proposed by Frederick et al. is to separately identify γ and then use it to evaluate δ. Our questionnaire allows to
recover γ with the following set of lottery questions.
8Questions Q109—Q111 have a similar structure, dealing with risk attitudes. In this case we
assume that the prize won is to be paid immediately. However, the lottery organization is not
entirely reliable. There is only a 70 percent probability of being paid. We now deﬁne x as the
certain amount that is oﬀered to individuals in exchange for the lottery ticket. The random gain
from participation to the lottery, P,i s1000−x with 70 percent probability and −x with 30 percent
probability. To construct the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (ARA), we follow Guiso
and Paiella (2001). If the respondent is indiﬀerent between receiving x and holding the ticket, her
absolute risk aversion is:
ARA =2
E(P)
E(P2)
(1)
where
E(P)=0 .7 · (1000 − x)+0 .3 · (−x)
and
E(P2)=0 .7 · (1000 − x)2 +0 .3 · x2.
By repeating the questions with diﬀerent levels of x, we are able to identify four brackets for the
risk aversion measure. In particular, the ﬁrst question oﬀers x = 700, which is the expected value
of the lottery. If the respondent is willing to accept, we then ask if she would accept x = 600.
In the opposite case, we ask if she would accept x =8 0 0 . A possible extension is to repeat
the questions with diﬀerent prize values, to see whether risk attitudes change with wealth. An
alternative approach would be to ask directly the amount x for which the individual is indiﬀerent
between selling the ticket and participating to the lottery. These questions are discussed in more
detail in Section 5.4, where we present results from the pilot surveys.
2.4 Attitudes towards social security
This last chapter of the questionnaire asks questions about the worker’s personal views on the role
of the social protection system, expectations about the future of the pension system, and willingness
to pay for public protection programs. Workers who are not aﬃliated, in fact, may be willing to
contribute (perhaps after some rules are changed), while aﬃl i a t e sm a yh a v eb e e ns i m p l yf o r c e dt o
join. Our aim is to understand the eﬀects of personal views and attitudes on strategic behavior in
life cycle planning and risk management.
We start with overall questions about the perceived role of the government in providing social
security. The ﬁrst question (Q112) asks the respondent whether the government, or the employer
9or the worker herself should be responsible for providing social security beneﬁts. Question Q113 is
about preferences between a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and a fully-funded pension system. The next
question, Q114, asks what the government should do to maintain the balance between contribution
and beneﬁts. Questions Q115 and Q116 are about personal views about social security contribu-
tions, i.e. whether the respondent sees them as a way to ﬁnance her own social security beneﬁts,
as the duty of a good citizen, as a characteristic of stable jobs with better working conditions, as
a way to redistribute wealth or as an investment for the future, etc.
Subjective probabilities of events related to the social security system are asked in questions
Q117—Q124. In particular, the respondent is asked about the probability of change in: the type
of social security system; contributions and beneﬁts; the eligibility conditions; and the coverage.
For contributions and beneﬁts, respondents are asked the subjective probability of an increase or
a decrease. For beneﬁts, the probabilities of increase or decrease are asked separately for old age,
disability and survivors.
In Q126—Q137 and Q140—Q142, individuals currently aﬃliated to the social security system
are asked whether they would like to change the level of contributions, taking into account the
associated changes in beneﬁts. In particular, they are asked if they would like to receive a higher
retirement pension even if this would imply higher contributions (Q126). Interviewers should stress
that the change in contributions would aﬀect the entire working life. Respondents are then asked
whether they would like to reduce contributions even if this would imply a lower pension (Q127).
People willing to pay lower contributions are also asked what is their preferred percent reduction in
contributions (Q129). They are also asked if they would like to stop contributing (Q128). Question
Q130 asks about motivation for low willingness to pay. Questions Q131—Q135 repeat the same
questions with respect to workplace accident insurance, while Q140—Q145 are about willingness to
pay for the unemployment insurance.
The aim of Q137—Q138 and Q146—Q148 is to explore the willingness of non-contributing workers
to become aﬃliated to the public system. Question Q137 and Q138 ask whether the person has
ever paid social security contributions and reasons for not paying. Questions Q146—Q148 ask if
she would have accepted to reduce her earnings in order to obtain an unemployment insurance.
Diﬀerent percent reductions in earnings are proposed in the three questions.
Finally, question Q149 tries to elicit preferences between diﬀerent insurance programs in trade-
oﬀ situations (i.e. with a budget constraint). This question is important to understand if, for
example, “unbundling” the social security package would increase aﬃliation. Respondents are
10asked for what public insurance program they would like to increase the beneﬁt, provided that this
would imply a reduction in beneﬁts for other programs.
3 The Bulgarian and Colombian pilots
T w op i l o ts u r v e y sw e r ec a r r i e do u tt ot e s tt h ee ﬀectiveness of the basic questionnaire, to improve
the questionnaire’s design, and to identify problem areas and peculiarities of the ﬁeldwork.
3.1 Choice of countries
The two pilot surveys were carried out in Bulgaria and Colombia, during the months of May and
June 2006, with a target sample size of 200 households in Bulgaria and 100 households in Colombia.
Appendix A compares a set of indicators for the two countries. In 2004, the level of per capita
GDP in terms of purchasing power parity was a little higher in Bulgaria than in Colombia (7840
and 6975 US$ respectively). However, the two economies show marked diﬀerences in performance
and structural changes in the years preceding the pilot surveys. Bulgaria is a transition economy.
Over the 1990s it experienced a systemic change to a market-based economy, with a major drop
in GDP/capita in the early phases of the transition and subsequent modest recovery. Only in the
most recent year did the Bulgarian economy recovered fairly rapidly (GDP grew at 4.8 percent in
the 2000-2004). Colombia undertook major reforms in the past decade but was also aﬀected by
regional and domestic crises.
Despite these substantial diﬀerences, the structure of the two economies is fairly similar: agri-
culture accounts for around 10% of GDP, industry for around 30% and services for the remaining
60%. Unemployment is around 14% in both countries, but an important diﬀerence is the labor
force participation rate among people aged 15—64, which is higher in Colombia for both men and
women.
The fraction of female employment in industry is higher in Bulgaria than in Colombia, while
the opposite is true for employment in services. The fraction of women in agriculture is exactly
the same. For men, the fraction of agricultural employment is much higher in Colombia than in
Bulgaria, while the opposite is true for employment in industry and roughly the same fraction is
employed in services.
The size of the shadow economy as a share of GDP was found to be similar in the two countries
in a study by Schneider (2005). The paper reports the share to be increasing from 1990 to 2000 for
both countries, from 29.4 to 36.9 percent in Bulgaria and from 33.4 to 39.1 percent in Colombia. In
11his deﬁnition of shadow economy, Schneider includes all activities that are concealed to the author-
ities in order to avoid compliance with taxes, social security contributions and other government
regulations. Another useful indicator of the level of informality is the share of self-employment,
w h i c hi sm u c hh i g h e ri nC o l o m b i at h a ni nB u l g a r i a(50.9 versus 14.9 percent). As far as social
security is concerned, 64.0 percent of labor force is a pension contributor in Bulgaria, while the
fraction is only 20.7 percent in Colombia. The tax revenue collected by the government as a frac-
tion of GDP is much higher in Bulgaria than in Colombia (22.3 versus 13.8 percent), whereas the
highest marginal tax rate is lower in Bulgaria both at the individual and the corporate level (29.0
and 20.0 percent versus 35.0 and 37.0 percent).
Appendix B compares the key features of the social security systems of the two countries. In
Bulgaria, coverage is mandatory for all employed individuals and the system is based on both social
insurance and individual account. In Colombia, coverage is mandatory for all workers but there is
a choice between social insurance and individual account. The Bulgarian system requires a higher
level of contributions towards the old age pension (roughly 25 versus 15 percent of earnings). Fur-
ther, eligibility conditions are stricter in Bulgaria than in Colombia, both in terms of minimum age
(63 versus 60 years for men, 58.5 versus 55 years for women) and in terms of years of contributions
(37.0 for men and 33.5 for women versus 20.2 for both men and women in Colombia). The social
insurance old age pension beneﬁt for an individual with minimum age and contribution require-
ments is lower in Bulgaria than in Colombia (roughly 35 percent versus 80 percent). There are less
diﬀerences with respect to sickness, maternity and work injury beneﬁts. Unemployment beneﬁts
in Bulgaria are 60 percent of earnings and are paid for up to 12 months, according to the coverage
period. In Colombia, the beneﬁt is equal to 1 monthly wage for each year of employment.
Despite the diﬀerences in the main socio-economic indicators and in the characteristics of the
ﬁscal and social security systems, both countries present a large informal sector. The diﬀerences in
the ﬁscal and social security systems of the two countries are particularly useful for our purpose,
because they can be exploited to identify the eﬀects that the social protection system may have on
the decision to participate to the informal sector.
3.2 Prior empirical evidence
Previous studies about informality in Bulgaria and Colombia provide a useful background for our
analysis, even if they were largely constrained by the available data. Hassan and Peters (1995)
use data from the 1992 Individual Budget of Households survey to discuss the eﬀectiveness of the
12Bulgarian social safety net. By analyzing the distribution of social security beneﬁts among low,
middle and high income groups, they conclude that while both the rich and the poor beneﬁtf r o m
the pension scheme, social beneﬁts such as unemployment beneﬁts and child allowances often accrue
to middle- and high-income households.
From a sociological perspective, Chavdarova (2003) analyzes the variety of informal activities in
Bulgaria during the 1990s. According to Chavdarova, working in the informal sector has diﬀerent
motivations depending on the number of jobs held. Those who have only one (informal) job are
likely to be underpaid and forced by subsistence needs, whereas moonlighters hold a second informal
job to avoid regulations. However, there is no empirical evidence to conﬁrm this hypothesis.
Marc and Kudatgobilik (2003) analyze informality in several South-East European countries.
The paper is based on poverty assessments by World Bank staﬀ and suggests that in these countries
informality is a survival mechanism whose existence is due to the failure of the formal sector. The
transition to a market economy led to a loss of public sector jobs and state-guaranteed job security,
increasing acceptance of informal and even illegal activities. The authors also stress that the
Roma minority is particularly involved in the informal sector, both because of poverty and cultural
reasons.
As for Colombia, Magnac (1991) identiﬁes the informal sector with self-employment (excluding
employers) and estimates a probit model for participation to this sector using data from a 1980
household survey. Higher educational attainments decrease the probability of holding an informal
job, whereas the eﬀect of experience has an inverted U-shape. In the estimated log-wage regression,
the coeﬃcient of the informal sector dummy is positive and signiﬁcant, even after controlling for
education and experience. Another result is the larger variance of wages in the informal sector.
An empirical analysis of the determinants of self-employment in Colombia is provided by De-
stré and Henrard (2004), using data from the 1996 Colombian National Household Survey.6 The
estimates of selectivity-corrected earnings regressions show that selection into self-employment has
a negative eﬀect on earnings. Therefore, the authors suggest that self-employment in Colombia
might be the result of a forced decision driven by subsistence needs. On the other hand, in a
probit model for self-employment, a larger potential earnings diﬀerential increases the probability
of being self-employed, after controlling for standard socio-demographic characteristics such as age,
education, marital status and regional dummies. As in Magnac (1991), the probability of being
self-employed decreases with higher educational attainments and increases with age.
6 The agricultural sector is not covered by the survey, and the sample is composed by male household heads only.
13The choice between diﬀerent pension programs is studied by Kleinjans (2003) with speciﬁc
reference to the Colombian system, where workers can choose between the social insurance and
individual account system. Data are from the 1997 Colombian National Survey About Life Quality.
The paper adopts a random utility approach, where agents choose between a public and a private
pension plan by maximizing the expected random utility. The deterministic term of utility is a
quadratic function of the rate of return in the chosen pension program. Taking into account the
default risk for the public pension and the market risk for the private pension, the parameters of the
utility function are estimated by maximum likelihood. Policy simulations suggest that a decrease
in the default risk would allow the government to reduce public pension beneﬁts, without causing
a large number of workers to switch to the private system.
3.3 Survey organization
The survey were carried out, on behalf of the World Bank, by a consulting company aﬃliated to
Gallup in Bulgaria, and by a team headed by Carlos Becerra in Colombia. Each country team was
responsible for choosing the sampling frame and the sampling design, translating and adapting the
survey instrument, selecting and training the interviewers, ﬁelding the survey, preliminary clean-up
of the data, and delivery of the ﬁnal data ﬁles.
In Bulgaria, 200 household interviews were carried out in 4 geographical areas: Soﬁa city (49),
Karzhali (51), Varna (50) and Razgrad (50). Households were purposely selected to make sure that
the questionnaire was administered to households with diﬀerent composition and characteristics.
In particular, the aim was to represent the most widespread types of employment status. Given
the focus on social security, another aim of the sample selection criteria was to include members
of the Roma population and households with disabled individuals. In addition, since most of the
questions in the survey are directed to employed individuals, households with members of working
age were over-represented. The ﬁeldwork team consisted of 1 supervisor and 2 enumerators in each
of the 4 areas. All of them were trained and briefed for the survey’s objectives on a training session
held in Soﬁa in the period 12-14 May.
In Colombia, interviews were carried out in the capital city of Bogotà and the sample was
stratiﬁed by income and other living standard into 6 strata, following the “estratiﬁcaciòn de Barrios
e Manzanas” for the city of Bogotà. Starting from the lowest stratum, the actual proportions in
the sample are, respectively 15, 20, 25, 29, 10, and 1 percent.
143.4 Adaptation of the basic questionnaire
The basic questionnaire was adapted to take into account country-speciﬁc characteristics, feedback
from the survey agencies, and the results of pre-tests aimed at checking the viability of certain
questions, especially those having to do with subjective beliefs and attitudes towards the Social
Security system. As a result, the speciﬁc formulation of some questions diﬀer. While this provides
more evidence on how diﬀerent formulations of the same question worked in the ﬁeld, it also limits
the comparability of the results for the two countries.
In the Bulgarian survey, household head status was self-reported by household members. In
most of the cases, the household head was the male with highest earnings in the household. When
a household member was not available for personal interview, a proxy respondent was allowed to
answer the majority of the questions in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The last two chapters ask about
subjective beliefs and opinions, therefore proxy respondents were not asked these questions. The
main job was deﬁned as the one demanding more hours. For Colombia, we do not have information
on the deﬁnition of household head and on the rule for proxy respondents.
There are minor diﬀerences between the two pilots in the questionnaire design. For example,
diﬀerent age groups were used as sample selection criteria for diﬀerent parts of the questionnaire. In
the Bulgarian survey, the reference age group was 15+ except for part of the questions in Chapter 4,
that were asked only to people aged 40+. In the Colombian survey, the reference group was 15+
except for Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, that were asked to people aged 30+.
Other relatively small diﬀerences have to do with the set of questions asked and their precise
formulation. In particular, no information on health status was collected in Bulgaria. Earnings are
net of taxes and social security contributions in Bulgaria but are gross amounts in Colombia. The
questions about life expectancy and retirement age were asked diﬀerently in the two surveys. In
Colombia people 30+ were asked “till what age do you expect to live”, whereas in Bulgaria people
15+ were asked “what are the chances (any number from 0 to 100, where 0 means unlikely and
100 means certain) that you will live to be age [70|80|90]?”. The formulation of the questions on
retirement age is similar to that of the question on life expectancy. For the subset of questions
about employment risks and health risks, property losses, and giving and receiving inheritances,
the Colombian sample was split up in roughly two halves and two alternative formulations were
adopted: one based on scales (“muy probable”, “probable”, “poco probable”, “muy poco probable”)
and the other on percentages (“un numero entre 1 y 100”!). In Bulgaria, the question on willingness
to accept a job without social security coverage was only asked to people looking for a job. In
15Colombia, instead, it was asked to everybody.
An important piece of information missing in the two surveys is the age when the person ﬁrst
started working.
3.5 Fieldwork
Both pilots were conducted in the Spring of 2006. In Bulgaria, 23 interviews were carried out
between May 15 and 19 to pre-test the questionnaire. The pilot survey was carried out between
May 27 and June 18. In Colombia, the pilot survey was carried out between May 22 and June 3,
and high-income households were interviewed during the weekends.
Interview duration ranges between 30 and 180 minutes and, on average, is equal to little less than
90 minutes. Average interview duration is slightly longer in Bulgaria (84 minutes) than in Colombia
(79 minutes), and the minimum and maximum durations are also slightly longer in Bulgaria (30 and
191 minutes respectively) than in Colombia (20 and 185 minutes respectively). In both countries,
interview duration varies with the number of household members eligible for interview (aged 15+)
and tends to be higher for households where income and educational attainments are low. For these
households, completing the questionnaire was often not easy because of the lack of information on
many topics and the diﬃculties in understanding some of the questions. Interviewers spent a
substantial amount of their time explaining survey questions in these cases.
As far as interviewers are concerned, it would be useful to have information on characteristics
such as gender, age, education and past experience. Unfortunately, the available data does not
contain this piece of information.
3.6 Sample size
The initial number of records in the Bulgarian ﬁle is 512, from 200 households. After dropping
people aged less than 15 (59 observations dropped) and people aged 15 and older who stopped
answering at the question on employment status (29 observations dropped), we are left with a
sample of 428 individuals of working age from 200 households. Among these, 125 (29.2 percent)
were not available for personal interview and proxy respondents answered for them. As a conse-
quence, for questions on subjective beliefs and personal opinions (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of the
questionnaire), the sample size is 303. The fraction of people not available for personal interview
is particularly high for age group 15—19 (80 percent).
The initial number of records in the Colombian ﬁle is 280, from 102 households. Of these,
however, 26 records contain no suitable information. After dropping people aged less than 15
16(69 observations dropped) and people for whom only basic demographic information is available
(8 observations dropped), we are left with a sample of 177 individuals of working age from 79
households.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the working age population by age group and gender in the two
samples. Notice that women always represent more than half of the sample, but their percentage
is lower in the Bulgarian sample (54.4 percent)t h a ni nt h eC o l o m b i a ns a m p l e( 5 7 . 6p e r c e n t ) .
3.7 General issues encountered in the ﬁeld work
This section brieﬂy discusses some general problems encountered during the ﬁe l d w o r ki nt h et w o
countries.
Although interviewers report that most survey questions were generally well understood in
Bulgaria, even by respondents with low educational level, a number of problems have to be kept in
mind when analyzing the data from the Bulgarian pilot. First, many respondents had a low level of
awareness about the social security system and its speciﬁc details. Apparently, many respondents
became aware of these details (like their own social security status, the criteria for receiving old age
pension, or maternity/work injury/sickness insurances, etc.) during the interview. This group of
respondents consist largely of low educated people (including the Roma population), teen-agers and
adults without working experience. Some of them gave tentative answers based on the knowledge
or the estimates generated at the time of the interview, others just answered “Don’t know” (DK)
or provided no answer.
Second, some people were unwilling to answer questions concerning income from ﬁrst/second
job, total annual income and working time. This is particularly true for respondents employed in
the informal sector, who tend to conceal part of their real income. Due to the uncertainty (job loss
or control by the tax/social security administration) of the informal employment, they preferred to
hide their income or even not to share their full employment status (second, third jobs).
Third, interviewers faced strong social-psychological barriers when eliciting expectations about
life duration and other risky events (sickness, accidents). For many respondents these are “taboo”
topics, and answering them is interpreted as “challenging the fate”. This group of respondents
consists largely of people who are low educated, strongly religious, elderly, sick or disabled.
Fourth, the design of the questionnaire ignored a few marginal categories who face diﬃculties
to identify themselves in the indicators and the logic of the questionnaire. These categories include
some forms of self-employed (for example seasonal/agricultural workers, people employed in tobacco
17growing), working pensioners and working students, people employed in family business, and people
registered as unemployed but working occasionally.
Fifth, employment status was diﬃcult to deﬁne for some types of respondents, such as people
employed in family business and caretakers for other persons.
Many of these problems are common in household surveys and were also encountered in the
Colombian pilot. A speciﬁc problem in the latter case was the fact that the target for each question
was not clear from the format of the paper questionnaire.
4 How representative are the two samples?
This section analyzes how representative the two samples are. The analysis is restricted to the
sample of people of working age, namely those aged 15 and older (428 observations from Bulgaria
and 177 observations from Colombia). We report results from the standard questions on basic
characteristics (age, gender and educational attainments), labor force status, employment status,
and earnings. Results are discussed after a short description of nonresponse rates.
The main conclusion is that, although the distribution of the two samples by gender, age and
education is somewhat diﬀerent from the corresponding population distribution, the basic statistical
relationships between labor market outcomes (activity rates, employment rates, unemployment
rates and earnings) and personal characteristics are remarkably close to known results from other
samples or other countries. This suggests that our samples may be used not only to check the
quality of the ﬁeld operations and the questionnaire, but also to draw tentative conclusions about
at least some of the substantive relationships that our questionnaire is designed to help analyze.
4.1 Distribution by age
Table 2 shows the age structure of the two samples by gender, and compares it with the population
age structure provided by the U.N. Population Division for 2005. Both samples over-represent
people in the central age group (aged 30—54) and under-represent the oldest people (aged 65+).
The Colombian sample also under-represents the younger people (aged 15—29). Overall, however,
the structure of the two samples by age and gender broadly agrees with the population structure.
4.2 Distribution by educational attainments
Table 3 presents the breakdown of the two samples by age group, gender and completed education.
We recoded educational attainments into three mutually exclusive categories: “tertiary educa-
18tion”, “only secondary education” and “at most primary education”. For the Bulgarian sample,
the category “tertiary education” includes people with university degrees (bachelor, master or post-
graduate), the category “only secondary education” includes people with (vocational or general)
upper-secondary education completed or with “semi-higher” education, while the category “at most
primary education” includes people with lower educational attainments. For the Colombian sam-
ple, the category “tertiary education” includes people with at least 5 years of graduate education or
with postgraduate education, the category “secondary education” includes people with secondary
education completed, “escuela tecnica o tecnologica” or less than 5 years of university education,
while the category “primary education” includes people with lower educational attainments.
The Bulgarian sample contains only one missing value on education. The person for whom
information is missing was not available for personal interview. The Colombian sample contains
no missing values for education.
Relative to the Bulgarian sample, the Colombian sample contains a larger fraction of people
with primary education (25.4 versus 19.0 percent), a smaller fraction of people with secondary
education only (45.7 versus 54.3 percent), and a slightly larger fraction of people with tertiary
education (28.8 versus 26.7 percent). Interestingly, whereas in the Bulgarian sample educational
attainments vary little with gender and age, in the Colombian sample they are higher for men than
for women and tend to fall with age.
4.3 Labor force status
Table 4 shows the breakdown of the two samples by age group, gender and labor force status
(employed, unemployed, and out of the labor force).7 From the table, one can compute and
immediately compare activity rates, employment rates and unemployment rates by main socio-
demographic group for the two samples.
The aggregate activity rate is a little higher in the Bulgarian than in the Colombian sample
(78.9 versus 74.6 percent), but there are also noticeable diﬀerences by gender and age group between
the two samples.
The aggregate employment rate is about the same in the two samples (70.3 percent in Bulgaria
and 71.8 percent in Colombia), but in the Bulgarian sample the employment rate is higher for
women (73 percent) than for men (67.2 percent), while in the Colombian sample it is just the
opposite (80 percent for men and 65.7 percent for women). Again, not only the diﬀerential between
7 In the Colombian sample there is no missing value for labor force status, whereas in the Bulgarian sample there
is only one.
19men and women is negative in Bulgaria and positive in Colombia, but its size is much smaller in
Bulgaria than in Colombia.
The aggregate unemployment rate is much higher in the Bulgarian sample (10.7 percent) than
in the Colombian sample (3.8 percent). Further, while in the Bulgarian sample the unemployment
rate is about the same for men and women (10.3 versus 11 percent), in the Colombian sample it is
higher for men than for women (6.3 versus 1.5 percent).
Table 5 summarizes the variability of activity rates, employment rates and unemployment rates
across diﬀerent socio-demographic groups in the two samples by ﬁtting logit models to the indi-
vidual data. The outcome variable is a 0-1 indicator representing whether a person is active (or
employed or unemployed). The predictors are indicators for the gender, age group and educational
attainments of a person (primary education only, or lower education, and tertiary education, or
higher education). The intercept of the model represents the log-odds of being active (or employed
or unemployed) for a men aged 30—44, with secondary education only. At the bottom of the ta-
ble, χ2 denotes the value of the statistics for testing the joint signiﬁcance of age and education
respectively.
While conﬁrming our previous results on the role of age and gender, the table adds information
on the role of schooling attainments. For both samples, lower education is associated with lower
activity rates, lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates, whereas higher education
is associated with higher activity rates, higher employment rates and (at least in Bulgaria) lower
unemployment rates. Notice that the pseudo R2 of our logistic regressions are far from small,
especially for activity and employment, indicating that gender, age and educational attainments
alone are enough to predict labor force status for 30—40 percent of the cases in the Bulgarian sample
and for 20—30 percent of the cases in the Colombian sample.
4.4 Employment status
For people who are employed, we distinguish between formal and informal employment by using
the information on the characteristics of the main job and the presence and nature of second jobs.
We consider several possible deﬁnitions of informal employment by distinguishing between: (i)
self-employed and dependent employees, (ii) workers who pay and who do not pay social security
contributions, and (iii) workers who have and who do not have an informal second job. Because
almost all second jobs are informal, that is, either self-employment or jobs for which social security
contributions are not paid (38 out of 40 in the Bulgarian sample, and 9 out of 11 in the Colombian
20sample), for simplicity in what follows we do not distinguish between formal and informal second
jobs. For employees, we further distinguish between: (iv) workers with or without a (written)
contract, and (v) workers employed in a small (less than 6 workers) or in a larger ﬁrm (6 employees
or more).
Nonresponse rates for questions on job characteristics are very low. However, some respondents
were not informed about all job features and sometimes answered “Don’t know” (DK). For Bulgaria,
there was no nonresponse for questions on employment status and dual job holding. When asked
about contributions to a pension fund, all 301 employed individuals provided an answer, but 8 of
them (2.7 percent) answered DK. Information on the type of contract is missing for 23 out of 243
employees (9.5 percent), whereas information on the size of the business is missing for 7 out of 243
employees (2.9 percent), and 37 respondents answered DK (15.7 percent of respondents).
In the Colombian survey, there was no nonresponse for questions on employment status and ﬁrm
size. When asked about contributions to a pension fund, only 1 employed person did not provide
an answer. Information on the type of contract is missing for only 1 employee. With respect to
dual job holding, employed individuals were asked how many jobs they had at the beginning of
Chapter 1. For this question, there was 1 nonrespondent out of 127. After questions on the main
job, respondents were again asked if they had another job or if they did any paid work outside the
main job. For these questions, there was no nonresponse.
In the Bulgarian sample, the fraction of workers who are self-employed is 19.3 percent (20.6
percent for men and 18.2 percent for women), the fraction of workers who report not paying
contributions is 15.4 percent (14.2 percent for men and 16.3 percent for women), while the fraction
of workers who report having a second job is 13.2 percent (10.6 percent for men and 15.3 percent
for women). On the other hand, the fraction of employees who do not have a contract is only 4.5
percent (7.1 percent for men and 2.5 percent for women), while the fraction of employees working
in small ﬁrms is 14.6 percent (11.9 percent for men and 16.5 percent for women).
In the Colombian sample, instead, the importance of “informal” jobs is much higher than in the
Bulgarian sample. The fraction of workers who are self-employed is 50.4 percent (41.7 percent for
men and 58.2 percent for women), the fraction of workers who report not paying contributions is
46.0 percent (41.7 percent for men and 50.0 percent for women), while the fraction of workers who
report having a second job is 8.7 percent (10.0 percent for men and 7.5 percent for women). On
the other hand, the fraction of employees who do not have a contract is 22.6 percent (20.6 percent
for men and 25.0 percent for women), while the fraction of employees working in small ﬁrms is 19.0
21percent (14.3 percent for men and 25.0 percent for women).
Table 7 summarizes the variability of the ﬁrst three indicators of informality, namely being self-
employed (self), do not paying social security contributions (nocontrib), and having a second
job (second), across diﬀerent socio-demographic groups in the two samples by ﬁtting logit models
to the individual data. The outcome variable is a 0-1 indicator of informality. The predictors are
indicators for the gender, age group and educational attainments of a person. The intercept of the
model represents the log-odds of being informal (according to the four diﬀerent deﬁnitions) for a
men, aged 30—44, with secondary education only.
Self-employment and not paying social security contributions are more likely among people
with lower education and less likely among people with higher education, while the opposite is
true for having a second job. While the role of gender is less clear-cut, informality appears to be
more frequent among younger and older people and less frequent among workers in the central age
groups.
Table 8 summarizes instead the variability of the two indicators of informality for employees,
namely not having a contract (nocontract)a n dw o r k i n gi nas m a l lﬁrm (smallf). Also in this
case, informality is more likely among the lower educated employees and among employees who are
younger and older, whereas gender is not statistically signiﬁcant.
If compared to the 2004 country indicators in Appendix A, self-employment rates are somewhat
higher in our sample for Bulgaria, while they are approximately the same for Colombia. With
respect to the size of the informal sector, the survey provides multiple indicators that are not directly
comparable to the single measure provided by Schneider (2005). However, while the informal sector
size estimated by Schneider is similar for the two countries, indicators derived from the pilot surveys
point towards a much larger informal sector in Colombia than in Bulgaria.
4.5 Earnings
Information on hourly earnings was derived from questions on monthly earnings and usual weekly
hours of work.8 A simple way of describing the variability of earnings between workers with
diﬀerent observable characteristics is to estimate a Mincerian log-earnings equation for each of the
two countries. The outcome variable is the logarithm of current hourly earnings (deﬁned as current
8 In Bulgaria, usual weekly hours were missing for only 2 out of 301 workers (0.7 percent). Monthly earnings
were missing for 32 workers (10.6 percent). As a result, hourly earnings were missing for 33 workers (11.0 percent).
In Colombia, usual weekly hours were missing for 1 out of 127 workers (0.8 percent). Only 6 workers did not report
monthly earnings and they are all self-employed (9.4 percent of self-employed workers). As a result, hourly earnings
were missing for 8 workers (6.3 percent).
22monthly earnings divided by 4.2 times usual weekly hours of work), whereas the predictors are
indicators for the gender, age and educational attainments of a worker. To avoid problems arising
from extreme values of earnings, the log-earnings equation has been estimated by least absolute
deviations rather than ordinary least squares. The results then best describe the behavior of the
median of log-earnings.
Table 9 presents, for each country, the results obtained from three models: (i) a basic model,
ﬁtted to all workers aged less than 65, with only gender, a quadratic term in age and schooling
indicators as predictors, (ii) the basic model, ﬁtted to all workers aged less than 65, with additional
indicators for not contributing to old age insurance (OAI) and for being self-employed, and (iii) the
basic model, ﬁtted only to the subset of employees aged less than 65, with additional indicators for
working without a contract and for being an employee of a small ﬁrm. For all three models, the
constant term corresponds to the median hourly earnings of a male worker, aged 40, with secondary
education only.
Not surprisingly, in both the Bulgarian and the Colombian samples, hourly earnings tend to be
higher for men than for women, and tend to increase with the age and the schooling attainments of a
person. The main diﬀerences between the two samples are that the gender gap and the educational
premia tend to be smaller in Bulgaria than in Colombia. Further, while the coeﬃcients for the
informality indicators are all positive in Bulgaria (except for the indicator for being an employee in
as m a l lﬁrm), they are all negative in Colombia, although only the indicator for not contributing
to OAI is statistically signiﬁcant. The results for our Colombian sample are in line with those
obtained by Magnac (1991) and Attanasio et al. (2004) using diﬀerent waves of the “Encuesta de
Hogares”. Diﬀerences between the two samples may be partly explained with the fact that earnings
are net of taxes and social security contributions in Bulgaria, whereas they are gross amounts in
Colombia. In addition, the regressions take no account of selectivity issues.
5 Main empirical results
This section focuses on the areas that represent the main novelty of the survey, namely those con-
cerning job satisfaction, job search, subjective beliefs about uncertain events and attitudes towards
the social security system. For these questions, a more detailed analysis of nonresponse patterns
is provided. First the number of missing answers is reported, relative to potential respondents.
In cases where nonresponse rates were higher than 10 percent, a logistic regression is estimated
to detect any systematic relationship between nonresponse and main socio-demographic variables
23(gender, age and educational attainments). The evaluation of nonresponse rates required a careful
analysis of skip patterns in the questionnaire, because missing values and “not applicable” had the
same code in the available data.
5.1 Job satisfaction
In Bulgaria, the question on overall satisfaction with the main job was: “Overall, how satisﬁed
are you with your ﬁrst/main job?”. Possible answers were “Very satisﬁed”, “Satisﬁed”, “Neither
satisﬁed nor dissatisﬁed”, “Dissatisﬁed” and “Very dissatisﬁed”. This question was asked personally
to all employed individuals (238 observations). In Colombia, the wording of the question was: “En
general, que tan satisfecho está Ud. con su trabajo principal?”. Possible answers were “Muy
satisfecho”, “Satisfecho”, “Ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho”, “Insatisfecho” and “Muy insatisfecho”.
The question was also asked to all employed individuals (127 observations). For both Bulgaria and
Colombia, there were no nonrespondents.
Table 10 presents the estimates of a logit model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the
respondent is overall satisﬁed or very satisﬁed with the main job and 0 otherwise. In Bulgaria, 68.5
percent of the sample report to be satisﬁed (67.4 for men and 69.1 for women). While gender does
not seem to be relevant, satisfaction is less likely among young people aged 20—29.
In Colombia, the fraction of satisﬁed workers is somewhat higher and equal to 76.4 percent
(80.0 for men and 73.1 for women). Again, gender is not statistically signiﬁcant, while satisfaction
is less likely among workers of age 45—54.
More speciﬁc questions were asked about satisfaction with some features of the main job.
In Bulgaria, the question was: “How satisﬁed are you with respect to the following charac-
teristics of your ﬁrst/main job? [Working hours per day|Social security beneﬁts|Skills match-
ing|Earnings|Flexibility|Work environment|Fringe beneﬁts]”. Possible answers were fewer than in
the overall question: “Satisﬁed”, “Neither satisﬁed nor dissatisﬁed” and “Dissatisﬁed”. A “Not ap-
plicable” code was also provided. This question was asked personally to all employed individuals.
In Colombia, the wording of the question was: “De las siguientes características de su trabajo
principal, qué tan satisfecho está Ud. con [El número de horas trabajadas a la semana| Las presta-
ciones sociales que tiene|Con la aplicación de sus conocimientos o experiencia en su trabajo|Con el
p a g oq u er e c i b ee ne s t et r a b a j o | C o ne lh o r a r i ol aboral actual|Con el ambiente de trabajo|Beneﬁcios
o subsidios distintos a los de ley que Ud. recibe]”. Possible answers were diﬀerent according to the
form used. In form A, available answers were only “Satisfecho”, “Ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho”, “In-
24satisfecho” and “No aplica”. In form B, there were two more available answers: “Muy satisfecho”
and “Muy insatisfecho”. Again, the question was asked to all employed individuals.
Satisfaction with social security beneﬁts is particularly important for the study of informality.
Interestingly, for both Bulgaria and Colombia, there were no nonrespondents, although this question
was considered not applicable for a large fraction of workers who do not contribute to a pension
fund (60 percent in the Bulgarian sample, 88 percent in the type A Colombian sample, and 65
percent in the type B Colombian sample).
Table 10 presents the estimates of a logit model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the
respondent is satisﬁed with social security beneﬁts provided by the main job and 0 otherwise. In
Colombia, we deﬁne as satisﬁed those who answer “Satisfecho” in form A and those who answer
either “Muy satisfecho” or “Satisfecho” in form B. When focusing on social security beneﬁts, The
fraction of workers who report to be satisﬁed with the main job is very diﬀerent in the two samples.
In Bulgaria, 65.7 percent of the sample report to be satisﬁed with main job social security beneﬁts
(62.0 for men and 68.0 for women). Satisfaction is less likely among lower educated people, while
gender and age are not statistically signiﬁcant. In Colombia, the fraction of workers satisﬁed with
their main job social security beneﬁts is only 23.4 percent (23.7 for men and 23.1 for women). There
is no clear-cut relationship between satisfaction and socio-demographic variables such as gender,
age or educational attainments.
5.2 Job search
One of the questions in the survey asks about willingness to accept a job without social security
coverage. If the respondent is willing to accept the job, the reason is then asked. This helps to
understand whether informal jobs are chosen optimally or as a temporary occupation while looking
for another job. Potential respondents were diﬀerent in the two pilot surveys.
In Bulgaria, the question was: “Would you accept a job that did not oﬀer social security
beneﬁts?”. The question was only asked to unemployed people available to answer in person (23
people). In Colombia, the question was asked to both employed and unemployed people, excluding
individuals with a second job (123 people). The wording was “Aceptaría Ud. un trabajo sin
prestaciones sociales?”. 9
In the Bulgarian sample, the fraction of respondents who would accept a job without social
security coverage is 65.2 percent (almost the same for men and women). The fraction of Colombian
9 In Bulgaria there were no nonrespondents, whereas in Colombia the number of nonrespondents was only 3 (2.4
percent).
25respondents who would accept a job without social security coverage is only 41.7 percent, and is
higher among women (51.6 percent) than among men (31.0 percent). Among the unemployed,
however, the fraction is similar to the Bulgarian sample, because 3 out of 5 people are willing to
accept the job. The larger proportion of workers accepting a job without social security coverage
among the unemployed in Colombia provide prima facie evidence that this is a second best option
for many. We will discuss this issue further in the paper. Due to the small number of unemployed
individuals in both samples, it is not possible to draw any conclusion on the relationship between
willingness to accept an informal job and basic socio-demographic variables.
In Bulgaria, of those willing to accept a job without social security coverage (15 people), almost
half (7) said that they would accept it temporarily while looking for a job oﬀering social security
coverage, 5 said that social security coverage was not important for them, and 3 gave other reasons.
There were no missing values on this question.
In Colombia, of those unemployed willing to accept a job without social security coverage (3
people), 1 said that he would accept it temporarily while looking for a job oﬀering social security
coverage, 1 said that social security coverage was not important for him, and 1 gave other reasons.
As for the Bulgarian sample, there were no missing values on this question.
5.3 Subjective beliefs and perceptions
In this section we consider a set of questions relating to subjective expectation about life duration,
retirement age, replacement rate, quality of life after retirement, future standards of living, and
perceived employment and health risks. For each of these topics, we only focus on a few questions
that we consider as representative of the response patterns in the two samples.
5.3.1 Life expectancy
Individual beliefs about future or uncertain events are strictly related to the decision of contributing
to social security. In particular, the value of aﬃliation to an old age pension program can be diﬀerent
depending on the respondent’s subjective beliefs about life expectancy. For example, people who
expect not to live for a long period after they retire, may be less interested in old age insurance.
The way in which these beliefs have been elicited is diﬀerent in the two pilot surveys.
In Bulgaria, respondents had to attach a probability to survive until age 70, 80 or 90. The
wording of each question was “What are the chances (any number from 0 to 100, where 0 means
unlikely and 100 means certain) that you will live to be age [70|80|90]?”. The questions were asked
personally to all people over 15 years of age and below the target age (284, 297 and 302 individuals
26for the three questions respectively). In the Colombian survey, instead, people aged 30+ (130
individuals) were simply asked about their life expectancy (“Hasta qué edad cree Ud. que va a
vivir?”). Nonrespondents in Bulgaria were 8 (all women) for the ﬁrst question (surviving till age
70), 13 (4.4 percent) for the second question (surviving till age 80), and 14 (4.6 percent) for the
third question (surviving till age 90). In Colombia, nonrespondents were only 2, both women aged
between 50 and 60. This question was also answered by some individuals aged less than 30, who
were not supposed to be asked. Our analysis of nonresponse and distribution of answers is limited
to the reference group 30+.
Tables 11 and 12 present some statistics on the distribution of answers to the three survival
probability questions in Bulgaria, and to the life expectancy question in Colombia. Table 13
presents the estimates of a logit model where the outcome variable is a 0-1 indicator of optimism,
where respondents are deﬁned as optimists if they assigned a probability higher than 50 percent
to a given event in the Bulgarian sample, or if they have a life expectancy higher than the median
value (80 years) in the Colombian sample.
In the Bulgarian sample, the mean subjective survival probabilities for men and for women are
52.3 and 52.8 (survival to age 70), 30.7 and 30.5 (survival to age 80), and 11.3 and 8.4 (survival to
age 90). Respondents in young and old age groups are more likely to give a high survival probability
than middle-aged individuals. The eﬀect of gender is less clear-cut.
In the Colombian sample, the mean life expectancy for women is equal to 75.7, which is equal to
life expectancy at birth as reported in the 2004 World Development Indicators. For men, the mean
life expectancy is 77.6, compared to a WDI life expectancy at birth of 69.6. It should be noted
however that the mean life expectancy for this sample is not directly comparable to life expectancy
at birth, because the former is an average of subjective beliefs of individuals aged 30+. Being older
than 65 and having lower education increase the probability of being an optimist.
5.3.2 Retirement age and replacement rates
A similar sequence of questions was used to elicit respondents’ beliefs about age at retirement. In
Bulgaria, respondents had to attach a probability to full-time work after age 50, 60 or 70. The
wording of each question was “What do you think the chances are (any number from 0 to 100) that
you will be working full-time after you reach age [50|60|70]?”. The questions were asked personally
to all people over 15 and below the target age (186, 253 and 284 individuals for the three questions
respectively). In the Colombian survey, instead, the expected age at retirement was asked: “Hasta
27que edad cree Ud. qué va a trabajar?”). The question was asked to employed individuals aged 30+,
excluding unpaid workers in family business (96 individuals). Nonrespondents in Bulgaria were
only 4 for the ﬁrst question (working full-time after age 50), 7 for the second question (working
full-time after age 60), and 6 for the third question (working full-time after age 70). In Colombia,
there was only one nonrespondent. This question was also answered by some individuals aged less
than 30, who were not supposed to be asked. Our analysis of nonresponse and distribution of
answers is limited to the reference group 30+.
Tables 14 and 15 present some statistics on the distribution of answers to the three full-time
work probability questions in Bulgaria, and to the expected retirement age question in Colombia.
Table 16 presents the estimates of a logit model where for the Bulgarian sample the binary outcome
is equal to 1 if the respondent has a subjective probability higher than 50 percent, and 0 otherwise,
whereas for the Colombian sample the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the respondent has an
expected retirement age higher than the sample median (60), and 0 otherwise.
In the Bulgarian sample, the mean subjective probability of full-time work for men and for
women are 84.0 and 84.2 (work after age 50), 62.4 and 51.2 (work after age 60), and 12.1 and 7.5
(work after age 70). Women are less likely to have a high subjective probability of working full-time
after age 60 and 70. There is also a negative eﬀect of lower educational attainments and a positive
eﬀect for age group 45—54.
In the Colombian sample, the mean expected retirement age is 62 for men and 60.6 for women,
whereas the minimum age required for the old age pension is 60 for men and 55 for women,
although it will increase to 62 and 57 respectively in 2014 (see also Appendix B). Women and
lower educated respondents are less likely to have a high expected retirement age, while the eﬀect
of higher education and of age groups 45—54 and 55—64 is positive. Despite the diﬀerent methods
used to elicit subjective beliefs about working life duration, some results are common in the two
samples. Being a male, having higher educational attainments and being aged 45—54 have a positive
eﬀect either on the subjective probability of being working (Bulgaria) or on the expected retirement
age (Colombia).
Another subjective belief that the survey tries to elicit is the expected replacement rate, i.e.
the expected pension as a percentage of last earnings. The wording of the question and the target
group was diﬀerent in the two pilot surveys. In Bulgaria, the question was: “What percentage
of your last (after tax) labor earnings you expect your post-retirement pension to represent?”.
This question was asked personally to employed individuals aged 40+ (159 individuals). In the
28Colombian survey, the question was “Qué porcentaje de su último ingreso laboral cree usted que
representará su pensión de jubilación?”. Respondents had to choose between the following brackets:
“Menos de 30%”, “Entre 30% y 40%”, “Entre 40% y 50%”, “Entre 50% y 60%”, “Entre 60% y 70%”,
“Entre 70% y 80%”, “Entre 80% y 90%”, “Mas de 90%”. The question was asked to employed
individuals aged 30+, excluding unpaid workers in family business (96 individuals). Among these,
27 are excluded from nonresponse calculations because their answer is coded as “No aplica”.
While nonresponse rates for the other questions were very low for both the Bulgarian and
Colombian sample (usually below 5 percent), this question had very diﬀerent nonresponse rates in
the two samples, much higher in Bulgaria than in Colombia. This diﬀerence may be partly due to
t h ef a c tt h a ti nt h eﬁrst sample respondents had to give a number, whereas in the second they were
asked to choose among ﬁxed brackets. Nonrespondents in Bulgaria were 49 (30.8 percent, 36.8 for
men and 27.4 for women). To check the existence of a systematic relationship between nonresponse
and socio-demographic variables, a logistic regression model is estimated, with the binary outcome
equal to 1 if the answer is missing and 0 otherwise. Being a man increases the probability of
nonresponse, as well as having a lower educational attainment and being older than 65. People
aged 45—54 are instead more likely to answer the question. On the other hand, in Colombia there
was only one nonrespondent.10
Table 17 presents some statistics on the distribution of answers to the replacement rate question
in Bulgaria. Table 18 presents the estimates of two simple linear regression models where the
subjective replacement rate is the dependent variable. In the ﬁrst model, standard explanatory
variables are used, whereas in the second model we use the number of years of contributions
instead of age. The intercept of the model is the average subjective replacement rate for a man
with secondary educational attainments and 40 years of age or 20 years of contributions. There is no
statistically signiﬁcant relationship except for a negative eﬀect of higher educational attainments,
however the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant after controlling for years of contributions.
With respect to the Colombian sample, subjective replacement rates were categorized into inter-
vals. Therefore, Table 18 presents the estimates of interval regression models where the dependent
variable is the latent subjective replacement rate. As for Bulgaria, the ﬁrst model includes age
whereas the second model controls for the number of years of contributions. In this sample, the
eﬀect of education is reversed with respect to the Bulgarian sample. In both models, the coeﬃcient
for lower educational attainments is negative and signiﬁcant. Further, coeﬃcients for age and years
10 This question was also answered by some individuals aged less than 30, who were not supposed to be asked.
Our analysis of nonresponse and distribution of answers is limited to the reference group 30+.
29of contributions are positive and signiﬁcant, although the latter is somewhat smaller. As for the
Bulgarian sample, gender is not statistically signiﬁcant.
5.3.3 Future standards of living
Individuals were asked to report their beliefs about future standards of living in two diﬀerent
questions. The ﬁrst one asked about the next ﬁve years, while the second asked about post-
retirement living standards.
Subjective beliefs about standards of living in the next ﬁve years were asked in both surveys,
although in a slightly diﬀerent way. In Bulgaria, the question was: “In your opinion, compared to
toda y ,yourstandardsoflivingin5y earswillbe: ...”. Possibleanswerswere“Muchimproved”,
“Slightly improved”, “Same”, “Slightly worse” and “Much worse”. This question was asked to all
individuals in the sample and available to answer personally (303 individuals). In the Colombian
survey, the question was “En los próximos cinco años su nivel de vida será: ...”. Possible answers
were “Mejor que el actual”, “Igual que el actual” and “Peor que el actual”. The question was asked
to all people aged 30+ (130 individuals).11
Table 19 presents the estimates of a logit model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the
respondent is optimist with respect to her quality of life in the next ﬁve years and 0 otherwise.
For Bulgaria, optimists are those who answer “Much improved” or “Slightly improved”. They are
42.4 percent of the sample (49.6 for men and 37.6 for women). Optimism is positively associated
with being male and age groups 15—19 and 20—29. People aged 55-64 and 65+ are less likely to be
optimists. In Colombia, optimists were a much higher fraction than in the Bulgarian sample: 68.5
percent of respondents (61.8 for men and 73.3 for women). Optimism is less likely among the lower
educated and again among people aged 55—64, while gender does not seem to be relevant.
The question on expected quality of life after retirement had a very similar wording in the two
pilot surveys. In Bulgaria, the question was: “What do you expect your standards of living will be
after you retire from your main job?”. Possible answers were “Better than today”, “Like today”,
“Worse than today” and DK. This question was asked personally to employed individuals regardless
of age (238 individuals). In the Colombian survey, the question was “Despúes de retirarse de su
trabajo principal, Ud cree que su calidad de vida será: ...”. Possible answers were “Mejor que la de
hoy”, “Como la de hoy”, “Peor que la de hoy” and DK. The skip pattern for this question was not
clear. To avoid overestimates of nonresponse, we use the same reference group as for the question on
11 In Bulgaria there was only 1 nonrespondent, whereas in Colombia there was none.
30the expected replacement rate, namely employed individuals aged 30+, excluding unpaid workers
in family business (96 individuals). Nonrespondents in Bulgaria were 21 (8.8 percent, 2.2 for men
and 12.7 for women) and, among the respondents, 36 answered DK (16.6 percent, 14.9 for men and
17.7 for women). A logistic regression model is estimated, with the binary outcome equal to 1 if
the answer is DK and 0 otherwise. People aged 20—29 and with low educational attainments are
more likely to give a DK answer. In Colombia, instead, all individuals answered the question and
there is no DK answer.
Table 19 presents the estimates of a logit model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the
respondent expects her post-retirement quality of life to be better than at the time of interview,
and 0 otherwise. In Bulgaria, optimists were 18.9 percent of respondents (24.1 for men and 15.4
for women). Optimism is associated with male gender and age 20—29. In Colombia, optimists
were a much higher fraction than in the Bulgarian sample: 55.2 percent of respondents (55.3 for
men and 55.1 for women). There is no clear-cut relationship between optimism and standard
socio-demographic variables.
5.3.4 Employment risks
Some questions aimed at eliciting subjective beliefs about employment risks. In particular, one
question was about the possibility of loosing one’s job in the next 12 months. In Bulgaria, this
question was asked personally to employees of any age (186 individuals): “In your opinion, how
likely is it that you will lose your job within the next 12 months?”. Possible answers were “Very
likely”, “Likely”, “Unlikely” and “Very unlikely”. In Colombia, a similar question was asked to
employed individuals aged 30+, excluding unpaid workers in family business but including the
self-employed (96 individuals). The question had a diﬀerent wording in form A and B. The former
asked for a qualitative answer: “Ud. Cree muy probable; probable; poco probable o improbable que
Ud pierda su trabajo dentro de los próximos 12 meses?”. Answers were coded as “Muy probable”,
“Probable”, “Poco probable” and “Muy poco probable”. For those with form B, the question
was: “Cuál es la probabilidad (un número entre 1 y 100) que Ud. pierda su trabajo dentro de los
próximos 12 meses?”.12
Table 20 presents the estimates of a logit model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the
respondent is optimist with respect to employment risks in the next 12 months, and 0 otherwise.
For Bulgaria, optimists are those who answered “Very unlikely” or “Unlikely”, and they are 65.6
12 Nonrespondents in Bulgaria were only 2, whereas in Colombia there was none.
31percent of the sample (63.8 for men and 66.7 for women). Optimism is negatively associated with
older age, while gender does not seem to be relevant.
In Colombia, respondents to form A are deﬁned as optimists if they answered “Poco probable”
or “Muy poco probable”, whereas respondents to form B are deﬁned as optimists if they had a
subjective probability lower than 50%. Optimists are 68.1 percent of form-A respondents (75.0
for men and 63.0 for women), and 67.3 percent of form-B respondents (77.8 for men and 54.5 for
women), although results are not directly comparable. From Table 20 and for form-B respondents,
optimism is less likely among women, while age group variables are not statistically signiﬁcant and
results from form A are less clear-cut.
5.3.5 Health risks
The survey tries to elicit subjective beliefs about health-related risks for the 12 months following
the interview. One of the questions is about the possibility of a serious illness and another one is
about the possibility of a serious accident. In both the Bulgarian and the Colombian samples, indi-
vidual assessments of the two risks are highly positively correlated. However, there are important
diﬀerences in the way beliefs were elicited in the two samples. The main one is that in Bulgaria
people were asked to attach a probability to a certain event, while in Colombia two diﬀerent forms
were used. For respondents using form B, a subjective probability was asked, whereas for those
using form A, answers were simply qualitative. This section discusses the main results for the two
questions and for each form separately.
In Bulgaria, both questions on illness and accident risk had the same wording: “Now we would
like to ask you some questions about risks. What are the chances (any number from 0 to 100)
that each of the following events could happen to you within the next 12 months? [Serious illness
(causing physical incapacity/unable to work for long time)| Serious accident (causing physical
incapacity/unable to work for long time)]”. This question was asked to all individuals available
to answer personally (303 people). In the Colombian survey, the questions for individuals with
form A were: “Ud. cree muy probable; probable; poco probable o muy poco probable, que en
los proximos 12 meses le pueda ocurrir a usted [Enfermedad grave|Accidente grave]”. For those
with form B, the questions were: “Cuál es la probabilidad (un número entre 1 y 100) que en los
proximos 12 meses le pueda ocurrir a usted [Enfermedad grave|Accidente grave]”. Unfortunately,
in the wording of this question probabilities range from 1 to 100 instead of 0 to 100. Actually,
a very large fraction of respondents answered “1”. In both forms, the question was asked to all
32people aged 30+ (130 people). Nonrespondents in Bulgaria were only 3 for the illness question,
and 5 for the accident question. In Colombia, there were no missing answers to questions in form
B (quantitative answers). For form A (qualitative answers), there was only 1 nonrespondent for
both the illness and accident questions.
Table 21 presents the estimates of a logit model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the
respondent is optimist with respect to health risks in the next 12 months, and 0 otherwise. For
Bulgaria, optimists are those who had a subjective probability lower than 50%, and they are 76.0
percent of the sample (76.0 for both men and women) for the illness question and 79.5 percent of
the sample (75.6 for men and 82.1 for women) for the accident question. The median subjective
probability for both questions is 10%. Optimism is positively associated with ages 20—29 and 45—54
for both illness and accident questions. Lower education has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect for optimism about accident risk, while age 65+ has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on optimism
about illness risk. Gender is not statistically signiﬁcant for any of the questions.
In Colombia, respondents to form B are deﬁned as optimists if they had a subjective probability
lower than 50%, as for the Bulgarian sample. Optimists among this group are a higher fraction
than in Bulgaria: 86.1 percent (82.8 for men and 88.9 for women) for the illness question and
81.5 percent (82.8 for men and 80.6 for women) for the accident question. The median subjective
probabilities are 3% for the illness question and 5% for the accident question, both lower than the
Bulgarian sample. Colombian respondents to form A are deﬁned as optimists if they answered
“Poco probable” or “Muy poco probable”, and they are 70.3 percent of respondents (73.1 for men
and 68.4 for women) for the illness question and 62.5 percent (61.5 for men and 63.2 for women)
for the accident question. These results are not directly comparable to form B, due to the arbitrary
choice of 50% as the probability below which a person is considered as an optimist. From Table 21
and for form-A respondents, optimism about both risks is less likely among individuals aged 65+
(as in the Bulgarian sample) and more likely among people with lowest and highest educational
attainments, while gender does not seem to be relevant. Results from form B are less clear-cut.
5.4 Impatience and risk aversion
To elicit individual risk aversion and impatience, the survey asked three questions for each of the
two topics. As discussed above, respondents were asked to imagine a hypothetical situation where
they held the winning ticket of a lottery. In the ﬁrst three questions (time preferences), the prize is
assumed to be certain but payable after one year. In the second group of questions (risk attitudes),
33the prize would be paid immediately, but there is a positive probability that the lottery organization
will not be able to pay for the prize. In both situations, individuals are asked if they would accept to
sell the winning ticket in exchange for a lower amount to be paid immediately (time preferences)/for
sure (risk aversion). According to the answer, the question is repeated using a diﬀerent amount
to be paid for the ticket. The questioning structure is the same for both pilot surveys, although
amounts and skip patterns actually used are diﬀerent.
5.4.1 Impatience
The impatience question for Bulgaria was: “Imagine you won the ﬁrst prize of a national lottery,
which is worth 1000 leva. The lottery administration is very reliable, so that you would get the
money for sure, but only one year from now (suppose there is no inﬂation). Then a friend of yours
asks you to sell him the ticket for 700, which he would pay immediately. What would you prefer
to have?”. If respondents preferred to have 700, they were not asked further questions. On the
other hand, if they chose 1000, they were asked if they would accept 800. If they still preferred
to have 1000 after one year, they were asked if they would accept 900. This set of questions was
asked to all individuals available for personal interview (303 people). The following table presents
the discount rates implied by the answers received.
B115 B116 B117 Discount rate
1000 1000 1000 r < 0.11
1000 1000 900 0.11 < r < 0.25
1000 800 - 0.25 < r < 0.43
700 - - 0.43 < r
In the Colombian survey, the ﬁrst question on impatience was: “Imaginese que Ud. se gana el
premio mayor de la loteria, que vale 1 millon de pesos, pero la loteria sólo le entregará el dinero
dentro de un año. Se sabe que la lotería siempre paga los premios y que el dinero vale lo mismo
en un año. Un amigo le propone comprarle el billete de loteria por 920,000 pesos que le pagaria de
inmediato. Qué preferiría?”. If respondents chose 920,000, they were not asked any other question
on this topic. If they preferred 1,000,000 one year later, they were asked if they would accept
950,000. Finally, if they still preferred 1,000,000 after one year, they were oﬀered 980,000. This
set of questions was asked to all people aged 30+ (130 people). The following table presents the
discount rates implied by the answers received.
34C104 C105 C106 Discount rate
1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 r<0 . 0 2
1,000,000 1,000,000 980,000 0.02 < r < 0.05
1,000,000 950,000 - 0.05 < r < 0.09
920,000 - - 0.09 < r
We deﬁne as missing those observations for which the complete set of answers is not available,
after taking into account the correct skip patterns. For Bulgaria there were no nonrespondents,
whereas in Colombia nonrespondents were only 5.
Table 22 presents the estimates of a logit model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the
respondent is impatient, i.e. if she is willing to accept the lower amount available immediately, and
0 otherwise. Of course, direct comparisons are not possible, because impatience corresponds to a
subjective discount rate higher than 43% in Bulgaria and higher than 9% in Colombia. In Bulgaria,
58.4 percent of the sample are impatient (59.5 for men and 57.7 for women), whereas in Colombia,
74.4 percent of respondents are impatient (73.1 for men and 75.3 for women). In both samples, age
and gender do not help predict impatience. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient for lower educational
attainments is always statistically signiﬁcant, although with a diﬀerent sign in the two countries.
5.4.2 Risk aversion
The risk aversion question for Bulgaria was: “Suppose now that the prize you won is not from a
national lottery, but from one which is less reliable, so that there is only a 50% chance to get the
money. However, in case you are lucky you get paid tomorrow. Your friend oﬀers you 500 for this
ticket. What would you prefer to have?”. If respondents preferred to have 500, they were asked
if they would accept 400 instead. On the other hand, if they chose 1000 at question B119, they
were asked if they would accept 600. This set of questions was asked to all individuals available to
answer personally (303 people).
The answers to these questions may be used to obtain a range for the Arrow-Pratt measure
of absolute risk aversion (ARA). We use the method presented in Guiso and Paiella (2001). The
following table summarizes how individuals are classiﬁed according to answers given. Risk neutral
individuals have ARA equal to 0, while for risk averse individuals ARA>0a n df o rr i s kl o v e r s
ARA<0. To obtain the relative measure of risk aversion, ARA should be multiplied by the level of
wealth.
35B118 B119 B120 Absolute risk aversion
1000 1000 - ARA < -0.0008
1000 600 - -0.0008 < ARA < 0
500 - 1000 0 < ARA < 0.0008
500 - 400 0.0008 < ARA
In the Colombian survey, the same structure was used, although with a probability of 70%
instead of 50%, and with diﬀerent amounts. The starting question was “Ahora suponga que el
premio ganado, un millon de pesos, no es de una lotería igual de conﬁa b l eal aa n t e r i o ryq u e
solo hay un 70% de probabilidad de que le pagen el premio, pero teniendo mucha suerte se la
podrían pagar mañana. Un amigo le ofrece 700,000, que preferiría Ud.?”. Unfortunately, the skip
patterns were not properly deﬁned for this set of questions. If respondents preferred 700,000, they
were not asked any other question on this topic. As a consequence, the measure of risk aversion
that we obtain is not as detailed as for Bulgaria, because we cannot separate risk neutral from risk
averse individuals. If respondents preferred 1,000,000, they were asked if they would accept 800,000
instead. This set of questions was asked to all people aged 30+ (130 people). The following table
summarizes the implied level of absolute risk aversion.
C107 C108 Absolute risk aversion
1000000 1000000 ARA < -0.0000009
1000000 800000 -0.0000009 < ARA < 0
700000 - 0<A R A
We deﬁne as missing those observations for which the complete set of answers is not available,
after taking into account the correct skip patterns. In Bulgaria there were no nonrespondents,
whereas in Colombia there were only 2.
Table 22 presents the estimates of a logit model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the
respondent has an absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. In Bulgaria,
58.7 percent of the sample consist of risk averse individuals (57.0 for men and 59.9 for women).
Risk aversion is positively associated with age 45—54 and 55—64, whereas gender is not statistically
signiﬁcant. In Colombia, a higher fraction of respondents is risk averse (79.7 percent, 81.5 for men
and 78.4 for women). Risk aversion is less likely among people with low educational attainments
and coeﬃcients for diﬀerent age groups are not statistically signiﬁcant. Again, gender does not
seem to matter much.
365.5 Participation and attitudes towards Social Security
In this section we consider a set of questions relating to who should be responsible for social security,
preferences between a PAYG and a fully-funded pension scheme, reasons for paying social security
contributions, expected future changes in the generosity of the social security system, willingness to
pay more contributions in order to receive a higher pension, willingness to receive a lower pension
in order to pay less contributions, and trade-oﬀs between the various components of the “social
security package”. As before, for each topic we only focus on a few questions that we consider as
representative of the response patterns in the two samples. Unless stated otherwise, these questions
were asked to all individuals in the sample.
5.5.1 Personal views on the social security system
Personal views about the social security system were asked somewhat diﬀerently in the two coun-
tries.
In Bulgaria, opinions about who should be responsible for social security were asked through four
diﬀerent questions: “Who do you think should be responsible for paying the [old age pensions|social
pensions, such as disability, survivors, etc.|social insurances (such as for unemployment, work injury,
etc.)|medical services]?”. For all questions, the possible answers were “The state”, “The employer”,
“Oneself”, “Other” or DK.
In Colombia, instead, a single question was asked: “En su opinión, quién debería encargarse de
las prestaciones sociales como la pensión de jubilación (vejez), los servicios médicos o de salud, la
pensión de invalidez o de supervivencia?”. Possible answers were “El gobierno”, “El empleador”,
“Uno mismo contratando una compañia de seguros” and “Otro”.
For Bulgaria, we focus on response patterns for the questions on old age pensions and disability
and survivors pensions. There were no nonrespondents for both questions, and among respondents
o n l y2a n s w e r e dD Kt ot h eﬁrst question (old age pensions), and only 1 answered DK to the second
question (disability and survivors pensions). The number of nonrespondents in the Colombian
sample was 7, with no DK.
The fraction of Bulgarian respondents who think that only the state should be responsible for
old age pensions is 84.8 percent, and is about the same for men and women. After controlling for
gender, age and educational attainments through a logistic regression, this fraction is signiﬁcantly
lower for teen-agers and people with higher education, and signiﬁcantly higher for older people
and people with lower education (Table 23). Gender does not seem to be relevant. Almost all
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(96.7 percent, about the same for men and women). There is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between this fraction and main socio-demographic variables.
In Colombia, the fraction of respondents who think that the state should be responsible for
social security is 64.1 percent, much lower than in the Bulgarian sample, but again about the
same for men and women. After controlling for gender, age and educational attainments through
a logistic regression, no systematic relationship emerges except that this fraction is signiﬁcantly
lower for people with higher education.
In Bulgaria, the question about preferences between a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) or a fully-funded
pension scheme was: “Suppose there are two possible pension schemes. In the ﬁrst one, current
contributions are used to ﬁnance pensions for current retirees, while in the second one contributions
add to your own pension. Which would you prefer?”. Possible answers were “Current contributors
paying for current pensioners” and “Contributions accumulating to own pension”. In Colombia,
the following question was asked: “Suponga Ud. que hay dos planes de pensiones. En el primero,
las cotizaciones se usan para ﬁnanciar las pensiones de los jubilados actuales. Mientras que en
el segundo las cotizaciones de cada persona se acumulan para pagar su propia pensión. Cuál
plan preferiría Ud.?”. Possible answers were “Cotizaciones para pagar los pensionados actuales”,
“Cotizaciones que se acumulan para la propia pensión” and DK. There were 11 nonrespondents in
Bulgaria (3.6 percent) and 8 in Colombia (4.5 percent). Among the respondents, only 1 person in
Colombia answered DK.
The fraction of Bulgarian respondents who would prefer a PAYG pension scheme is 22.3 percent,
about the same for men and women. Table 23 presents the estimates of a logistic regression model
where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the individual prefers a PAYG scheme and 0 otherwise.
The PAYG scheme is preferred by people aged 65+, while gender is not statistically signiﬁcant. In
Colombia, the fraction of respondents who would prefer a PAYG pension scheme is slightly lower
(18.9 percent), and is again about the same for men and women. Preference for PAYG schemes is
positively associated with age 55—64, whereas gender does not seem to be relevant.
5.5.2 Reasons for paying social security
There are many reasons why people may decide to pay social security contributions. One possibility
is that the social security system is perceived as a tool to support people in need (“solidarity
argument”). Another possibility is that the public pension is considered as a fair return on paid
38contributions (“economic argument”). Respondents to both surveys were asked to say how much
they agreed with a set of statements related to these diﬀerent motivations.
One statement was about the “solidarity argument”. For Bulgaria, the sentence was: “People
that are older or poorer need to be helped”. Possible answers were “Strongly agree”, “Agree”,
“Neither agree nor disagree”, “Disagree” and “Strongly disagree”. In Colombia, the sentence was
instead: “Las personas mayores o las pobres necesitan ser ayudadas”. Possible answers were “Muy
de acuerdo”, “De acuerdo”, “Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo”, “En desacuerdo” and “Muy en
desacuerdo”. The number of nonrespondents was 4 in Bulgaria and 6 in Colombia.
The fraction of Bulgarian respondents who agree or strongly agree with the “solidarity argu-
ment” is 96.3 percent, about the same for men and women. Table 24 presents the estimates of a
logistic regression model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the individual agrees or strongly
agrees with the statement and 0 otherwise. There are no clear-cut relationships between agree-
ment and main socio-demographic variables. In Colombia, the fraction of respondents who agree
or strongly agree is just a little lower (92.4 percent), although with some diﬀerence between men
(95.8 percent) and women (89.9 percent). Table 24 conﬁrms that after controlling for age and
educational attainments, agreement is less likely among women.
The statement about the “economic argument” for paying social security contributions was
phrased as follows in Bulgaria: “Paying SS contributions today is a good deal for me because
the return is adequate and secure”. In Colombia, the statement on economic convenience was:
“Pagando las cotizaciones a la SS hoy es un buen arreglo para mi porque la devolución es segura y
adecuada”. For both countries, the possible answers were the same as for the “solidarity argument”
question. The number of nonrespondents was 5 in Bulgaria and 6 in Colombia.
The fraction of Bulgarian respondents who agree or strongly agree with the “economic argu-
ment” is only 36.9 percent, about the same for men and women. Table 24 presents the estimates
of a logistic regression model where the binary outcome is equal to 1 if the individual agrees or
strongly agrees with the statement and 0 otherwise. Agreement is less likely among people aged 20—
29 and more likely among those aged 65+, while gender is not relevant. In Colombia, the fraction
of respondents who agree or strongly agree is instead quite high and equal to 63.2 percent, with
some diﬀerences between men and women (56.9 and 67.7 percent respectively). This result can
be explained by the fact that the individual capitalization system in Colombia has provided so far
relatively high returns.13 After controlling for gender and age, agreement is associated positively
13 A c c o r d i n gt ot h eSuperintendency of Financial Markets, the average returns in the period from December 2002
to December 2005 were 19.5 percent while the average inﬂation rate in that period was 5.6 percent.
39with lower education and negatively with higher education.
An additional question about reasons for not contributing to a pension fund was asked to people
who never contributed. In Bulgaria, the question was: “Why haven’t you paid (did you stop paying)
social security contributions?”. Possible answers were “Beneﬁts are too low compared to the costs”,
“Salary is too low to aﬀord it”, “You don’t have any choice (you are forced by the circumstances,
the decision of your employer,etc.”, “Don’t know how to do it”, “I have already paid enough”
and “Other”.14 Potential respondents were people available for personal interview who never paid
contributions to the social security system (25 people). In Colombia, the question was “Por qué
razón no cotizò?”. Possible answers were “Prestaciones demasiado bajas en comparación con lo
cotizado”, “El salario no me alcanza”, “Mi empleador no me ha aﬁliado”, “No sabe como hacerlo”,
and “Otro”. Potential respondents were people aged 30+ who never paid contributions to social
security (13 people). In both surveys, there were no nonrespondents. In the Bulgarian sample, 16
respondents out of 25 did not pay contributions because they were unemployed, students, or not
earning income. Other respondents did not contribute because beneﬁts were too low compared
w i t ht h ec o s t s( 4p e o p l e ) ,b e c a u s et h e yd i dn o th a v ea n yc h o i c e( 3p e o p l e )o rb e c a u s es a l a r yw a s
too low to aﬀord it (1 respondent). In Colombia, 13 respondents did not contribute because salary
was too low to aﬀord it (6 people), because of the employer (2 people), because they did not know
how do it (2 people), or for other reasons (3 people). In both samples, the lack of contributions
seems to be more related to personal reasons than due to the employer’s decision, although the
small sample size does not allow to generalize this result.
5.5.3 Expected changes in the social security system
Subjective beliefs about future changes in the social security system might aﬀect the decision to
aﬃliate. One of the survey questions asks about expected changes in the generosity of the system
in the next 10 years.
In Bulgaria, the question was: “In your opinion, over the next 10 years the public social
security system will be more generous, less generous or unchanged?”. Possible answers were “More
generous”, “Unchanged” and “Less generous”. In Colombia, the question was: “Cómo cree Ud que
será el sistema público de pensiones en los próximos 10 años?”. Possible answers were the same
as in Bulgaria, although with a diﬀerent ordering: “Más generoso”, “Menos generoso” and “Igual
que ahora”. In the Bulgarian sample nonrespondents were 15 (4.9 percent, 2.5 for men and 6.6 for
14 The question was only asked to people who never contributed, therefore the wording “(did you stop paying)”
and the answer “I have already paid enough” did not apply.
40women), whereas in the Colombian sample they were only 5.
Table 24 presents the estimates of a logistic regression model where the binary outcome is equal
to 1 if the individual expects the system to become more generous and 0 otherwise. In Bulgaria,
the fraction of optimists is 37.1 percent, higher for men than for women (41.5 percent and 34.1
percent respectively). However, after controlling for standard socio-demographic variables such as
age and education, neither gender nor age appear to be statistically signiﬁcant. In Colombia, the
fraction of optimists is smaller than in Bulgaria (13.9 percent), but again higher for men than for
women (17.8 percent and 11.1 percent respectively). The negative relationship between optimism
and female gender is conﬁrmed by the estimated logistic regression in Table 24. Further, lower
educated people are more likely to be optimists, while age is not relevant. In both countries,
one possible explanation for the low fraction of optimists is the future increase in minimum age
requirements for the old age pension, that is a consequence of recent pension reforms.
5.5.4 Willingness to pay and preferences over social security programs
A set of questions in Chapter 5 asks about respondents’ willingness to reduce (or to increase)
the level of contributions for the old age pension. The question make it clear that a reduction
(increase) in contributions would also imply a reduction (increase) in future beneﬁts. Respondents
were ﬁrst asked if they would have liked to pay higher contributions throughout their working life,
in order to receive a higher old age pension. Only if the answer was negative, they were asked if
they would have liked to reduce contributions throughout their working life, even if that implied
a reduction in the old age pension. Potential respondents were diﬀerent for the two pilot surveys.
In Bulgaria, they were people currently paying social security contributions or who contributed in
the past. In Colombia, potential respondents were only workers currently contributing to social
security, excluding unpaid workers in family business.
In Bulgaria, the exact wording for the ﬁrst question (willing to increase contributions) was:
“Would you like to receive a higher retirement pension even if that implies paying a higher con-
tribution throughout all your working life? ”. Potential respondents were individuals available for
personal interview, who were currently contributing to social security or contributed at least in the
past (278 people). In Colombia, the ﬁrst question was: “A Ud. le gustaría recibir una pensión de
jubilación mayor y mayores beneﬁcios, aunque eso le implique aumentar el valor de las cotizaciones
durante toda su vida laboral ?”. Potential respondents were all workers who were currently pay-
ing social security contributions (36 people). In Bulgaria there were no nonrespondents, while in
41Colombia there was only 1. The number of potential respondents in Colombia is very small due to
the low fraction of workers paying contributions to social security.
Table 25 presents the estimates of a logistic regression model where the binary outcome is equal
to 1 if the individual is willing to pay higher contributions and 0 otherwise. In Bulgaria, the fraction
of people willing to pay more is 56.1 percent, smaller for men than for women (52.2 percent and 58.7
percent respectively). However, after controlling for standard socio-demographic variables such as
age and education, gender is not statistically signiﬁcant in explaining willingness to pay higher
contributions. On the other hand, lower educated people are less likely to be willing to pay more.
People aged 65+ are instead more likely to be in favour of higher contributions. It should be noted
that this question was asked also to people already retired, because potential respondents were all
individuals who ever paid contributions. In Colombia, the fraction of people willing to pay more
is much higher than in Bulgaria: 91.4 percent, 100.0 percent for men and 81.2 percent for women.
However, results are not directly comparable, because in Colombia only people who were currently
paying contributions were asked this question. Retired people are therefore excluded. Due to the
small sample size, it is not possible to relate willingness to pay higher contributions to any standard
socio-demographic variable.
In both pilot surveys, an opposite question was asked only to those who were not willing to pay
higher contributions for the old age pension. In Bulgaria, the exact wording for the second question
(willing to reduce contributions) was: “Would you like to contribute less for your retirement pension
throughout your working life even if that implies receiving lower beneﬁts when you retire?”. In
Colombia, the second question was: “A Ud. le gustaría cotizar menos para la pensión de jubilación
aunque esto implique una disminución en el valor de la pensión, despúes de su retiro?”. 15
Table 25 presents the estimates of a logistic regression model where the binary outcome is
equal to 1 if the individual is willing to pay lower contributions and 0 otherwise. In Bulgaria,
the fraction of people willing to pay less is 32.8 percent, higher for men than for women (39.6
percent and 27.5 percent respectively). However, after controlling for standard socio-demographic
variables such as age and education, gender is not statistically signiﬁcant in explaining willingness
to pay lower contributions. On the other hand, people aged 20—29 are more likely to be willing
to reduce contributions. In Colombia, only 1 of the 3 respondents, female, is willing to pay lower
contributions.
People who never contributed to social security were asked if they would be willing to contribute.
15 In Bulgaria there were no nonrespondents out of 122 individuals, whereas in Colombia potential respondents
were only 4 and 1 was nonrespondent, male.
42The wording of the question was however diﬀerent in the two pilots. In Bulgaria, the question was
“Would you like to pay social security contributions in order to receive a pension when you retire?”,
and it was asked to people available for personal interview who never paid contributions (25 people).
In Colombia, the wording took into account the relationship between contributions and beneﬁts:
“Hubiera usted cotizado si las contribuciones hubieran sido más bajas, aun cuando los beneﬁcios
recibidos también hubieran sido menores?”. Potential respondents were individuals aged 30+ who
never contributed to social security (13 people). In both pilots, there were no nonrespondents.
In the Bulgarian sample, the number of people willing to pay contributions is 15 out of 25 if we
consider all respondents, and 4 out of 9 if we do not include those who said they did not contribute
because they were unemployed, students or with no income. It is worth noting that answers to
this question are consistent with the reasons provided for not paying contributions: all respondents
who did not pay because “beneﬁts are too low compared to the costs” said they were not willing
to contribute, whereas 3 people out of 4 who did not contribute for other reasons (“Don’t know
how to do it” or “Salary is too low to aﬀord it”) said they would be willing to contribute. In the
Colombian sample, all 13 respondents were working and 6 of them said they would be willing to
contribute. Cross-tabulations with reasons for not paying contributions provide mixed results: for
example, those who did not contribute because of the employer’s decision said they would not be
willing to contribute, whereas those who did not know how to contribute said they would be willing
to pay contributions, and 4 people out of 6 whose “salary was too low to aﬀord it”, said they would
have aﬃliated (if contributions were lower).
Respondents were also asked a question about preference among diﬀerent social security pro-
grams. The wording and potential respondents for this question were very diﬀerent in the two
pilot surveys. In Bulgaria, the question was: “Consider old age, survivors and disability insurance
provided by the public social security administration. Suppose that you can only increase the ben-
eﬁts provided by one program but, for budgetary reasons, this increase must be compensated by a
decrease in all other beneﬁts. Which of the following beneﬁts would you like to increase?”. Pos-
sible answers were “Old age insurance”, “Survivors insurance”, “Disability insurance”, “Sickness
and maternity beneﬁts”, “Work injury beneﬁts”, “Unemployment beneﬁts” and “None”. Potential
respondents were people available for personal interview and who contributed to social security
at least in the past, either currently working or not (278 individuals). In Colombia, the question
was: “A cuál de los siguientes programas considera Ud. que el gobierno debiera darle más recursos
aunque disminuya el presupuesto de otros programas?”. Possible answers were “Pensión de vejez”,
43“Pensión por discapacidad”, “Beneﬁcios por enfermedad y maternidad”, “Beneﬁcios por accidente
de trabajo”, “Beneﬁcios por desempleo” and “Ninguno”. Potential respondents were employees and
apprentices, whether contributing to social security or not (63 individuals). For Bulgaria, there was
only 1 nonrespondent, whereas 1 of the respondents answered DK. In Colombia, nonrespondents
were 5, with no DK.
Table 25 presents the estimates of a logistic regression model where the binary outcome is equal
to 1 if the individual would like to increase the old age pension beneﬁt and 0 otherwise. In Bulgaria,
the fraction of people with a preference for the old age insurance program is 65.0 percent, about the
same for men and women. Preference for the old age insurance program is more likely among people
aged 55—64 and 65+, and less likely among people aged 20—29. Gender, instead, is not statistically
signiﬁcant. In Colombia, 58.6 percent of respondents prefers the old age insurance (56.2 percent
for men and 61.5 percent for women). There is no clear-cut relationship between preference for the
old age insurance program and standard socio-demographic variables.
6 Does informality matter?
The empirical results of Section 5 do not take into account possible diﬀerences between formal and
informal workers, with respect to individual charateristics, subjective beliefs, or attitudes towards
risk and towards the social security system. In this section, the same regression models (when ap-
plicable) are estimated using a binary indicator of informality status as an additional regressor.16
Of course, the aim of the analysis is not to provide evidence of a causal eﬀect, but to detect diﬀer-
ences between formal and informal workers with respect to the following issues: overall satisfaction
with main job, satisfaction with social security beneﬁts provided by the main job, optimism about
life duration, optimism about working life duration, expected replacement rate, optimism about
next 5 years quality of life, optimism about post-retirement quality of life, optimism about em-
ployment risks, optimism about health risks, impatience, risk aversion, agreement with government
responsibility for social security, preference for PAYG pension scheme, agreement with solidarity
argument for paying social security contributions, agreement with economic argument for paying
social security contributions, and optimism about future generosity of the social security system. As
in Section 5, all regression models are estimated controlling for standard socio-demographic char-
16 In Section 4 we use ﬁve diﬀerent indicators: self, nocontrib, second, nocontract,a n dsmallf. However,
nocontract and smallf are only deﬁned for dependent employees, and second does not provide information on the
nature of the main job. In addition, we want to focus on social security and post-retirement issues, so we select
nocontrib as the most appropriate measure of informality for this section.
44acteristics, such as age, gender, and educational attainments. The sample selected for estimation is
diﬀerent, because here we focus on individuals who are currently working. For simplicity, we only
discuss the results of regression models where the informality indicator parameter is statistically
signiﬁcant.
In the Bulgarian sample, informal workers are signiﬁcantly less likely than formal workers to say
that they are overall satisﬁed with their main job. The same result is found in Colombia, but it is
not statistically signiﬁcant, partly because of the smaller sample size (Table 26). Not surprisingly,
a similar relationship is found for satisfaction with social security beneﬁts provided by the main
job. This result is statistically signiﬁcant for both samples (Table 26).
As it might be expected, informality matters particularly for post-retirement issues. The ex-
pected replacement rate is lower for informal workers than for formal workers in the Colombian
sample, but, somewhat surprisingly, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the Bulgarian sample (Ta-
ble 27). Diﬀerences between formal and informal workers seem to be relevant also with respect to
another subjective belief on post-retirement issues: optimism about post-retirement quality of life
is less likely among informal workers in the Bulgarian sample, whereas for the Colombian sample
there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship (Table 28). It is worth noting that informality is
negatively related to optimism about post-retirement quality of life, whereas it does not seem to
matter for optimism about next 5 years quality of life.
Optimism about health risks is less likely among informal workers in the Bulgarian sample, both
for the serious illness question and for the serious accident question (Table 29). In the Colombian
sample, these questions were asked using two diﬀerent methods and therefore the sample is too
small to obtain any statistically signiﬁcant relationship.
Informal workers are less likely to prefer a PAYG pension scheme in the Colombian sample,
whereas in the Bulgarian sample there is no signiﬁcant relationship between informality and pref-
erences about the type of pension scheme (Table 30).
7 W h a th a v ew el e a r n e d ?
T h ep i l o ts u r v e y sw e r ec a r r i e do u ti nt w oc o u n t r i e s that share some similarities but also have impor-
tant diﬀerences in economic structure and institutional setting. Therefore, the ﬁnding of a similar
behavior of respondents in the two samples is particularly interesting, whereas diﬀerent response
patterns to questions about the social security system may reﬂect diﬀerences in the institutional
setting of the countries.
45In both samples, nonresponse rates were generally very low (below 5 percent), even for ques-
tions on life duration and subjective probabilities. The only notable exception is the question on
expected replacement rates in Bulgaria. Nonresponse or DK answers are always associated with
low educational attainments. Other similarities between the two samples include: (i) a higher inci-
dence of informality among younger and older workers, and among people with lower educational
attainments, (ii) a low fraction of individuals preferring a PAYG to a fully-funded pension system,
(iii) a very large fraction of respondents choosing the old age pension as the most important social
security program, and (iv) a similar assessment of employment and health risks.
In the Colombian sample, the fraction of respondents who are not paying contributions towards
the old age pension is much higher than in the Bulgarian sample. Therefore, as it might be expected,
a much lower fraction of workers report to be satisﬁed with the social security beneﬁts of their main
job. In addition, optimism about the future generosity of the social security system is less common
in the Colombian than the Bulgarian sample. Finally, most respondents in the Colombian sample
report to be willing to pay higher contributions in order to have a higher pension beneﬁt, whereas
the fraction is much lower in the Bulgarian sample. On the other hand, more than half of the
Colombian respondents agree with the “economic argument” for paying contributions (“Paying SS
contributions today is a good deal”), whereas thef r a c t i o ni sm u c hl o w e ri nt h eB u l g a r i a ns a m p l e .
In both samples, informality seem to matter for job satisfaction and for subjective beliefs about
post-retirement issues. Holding an informal job is negatively associated with job satisfaction, with
expected replacement rates, with optimism about post-retirement quality of life, with optimism
about health risks, and with preference for a PAYG pension scheme.
The results from the pilot surveys provide also useful indications in order to improve both the
questionnaire and the organization of the survey.
7.1 Improvements to the questionnaire
A few questions should be added on self-reported health status and age when the person ﬁrst started
working. In addition, speciﬁc questions might be included in order to identify seasonal workers and
students or pensioners for whom work is not the main activity.
If contributions to an insurance program are paid, there is a possibility that other household
members could be covered by that insurance. The questionnaire does not address this issue, which
may be relevant for some countries, depending on the institutional setting. In addition, asking
about health insurance provided by the social security system might be useful in countries where
46contributing to the program entitles the workers to diﬀerent and/or additional beneﬁts with respect
to the basic medical services.
Life expectancy questions should be asked to everybody, whereas one should drop the question
on what source (media, family history or on medical records) was used to assess life expectancy. It
might be useful, however, to ask whether the parents of the respondent are still alive, if so how old
they are, and if they are not alive, at what age they died. In some cases, rewording the questions
could help to reduce diﬃculties when asking about sensitive issues, such as subjective beliefs about
mortality. In the pilot surveys, nonresponse rates were very low even for this question, but problems
may be encountered in less developed countries, due to superstition or distrust of strangers. One
possibility is to soften the question by avoiding reference to death, and focusing on the probability
of being in good health after a certain age. With this formulation, a low subjective probability
could imply that the individual does not expect to live enough to receive a pension, but it could
also mean that she would need health care and economic support when older. As a consequence,
the overall eﬀect on interest in social security programs could be not straightforward.
All questions related to the social security system should avoid synonyms and use either the
term “social security” or “social protection”. Amounts used in the risk aversion and impatience
questions should be calibrated to obtain useful brackets for the risk aversion parameter and the
subjective discount rate. For risk aversion, it should be noted that the obtained measure (ARA)
should be multiplied by wealth to obtain the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.17 For the subjective
discount rate, a possible benchmark is the market interest rate, which should fall in an intermediate
bracket.
In countries with a large fraction of low educated individuals, with a large size of the infor-
mal sector, or with low media coverage of social security issues, knowledge of the system will be
infrequent and questions on the social security rules could be aﬀected by nonreponse and a high
incidence of “Don’t know” answers. In this case, it isp r e f e r a b l et oa s kas i n g l e very simple question,
for example about minimum age requirements for the old age pension.
The set of questions on time preferences (Q106—Q108) and risk aversion (Q109—Q111) was
asked using simple closed-form answers and follow-up questions. In theory, it would be better to
ask a single open-ended question such as “What is the minimum amount for which you would sell
the ticket?”. This formulation would allow to construct a continuous variable for the subjective
discount rate and for the risk aversion parameter. On the other hand, it is possible that the
17 T h er e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcient is often assumed to be between 1 and 2, but some studies provide higher
estimates. An example is Barsky et al. (1997), where the coeﬃcient is estimated to be between 3 and 4.
47respondent would need more time to provide an answer. For questions on time preferences, it is
important to avoid any wording that could introduce the issue of risk. As a consequence, referring
to the winning ticket of a lottery might not be the best choice if the lottery administration is not
considered reliable.
The part on willingness to pay for social security programs was designed after considering sev-
eral alternative formulations. In a preliminary version of the questionnaire, willingness to pay was
assessed through a payment card method. The respondent was asked the maximum percent increase
in contributions she would have paid in order to have a certain percent increase in the pension ben-
eﬁt. The question was then repeated for diﬀerent percent increases in the beneﬁt. The hypothetical
increase in beneﬁts is however very diﬃcult to determine, because one should know the baseline
beneﬁt the respondent has in mind. This approach is rather complicated and time-consuming, so a
second version of the question was formulated using double-bounded dichotomous choice methods,
i.e. a set of yes/no questions with follow-up questions. The wording also speciﬁed that the hypo-
thetical increase in contributions would apply to the entire working life of the respondent, to avoid
a bias for older respondents. If the actual replacement rate was y, the question asked: “Consider
all the contributions you paid for public old age pension and those you will pay in your future
working life: Had you had the choice, would you have paid x% higher contributions (for all of your
working life) in order to get beneﬁts that are y(1+x/100)% of the salary instead of y%? (Suppose
you retire at the minimum age with 30 years of contributions)”. Then the respondent was asked if
she would otherwise be willing to pay a certain percentage, higher (lower) than x if she answered
yes (no). Even with this formulation, the question is too long and complicated for a multi-purpose
household survey. A simpliﬁed version (for example Q126 for the old-age pension) was therefore
used for the pilots, simply asking about willingness to pay higher (lower) contributions throughout
one’s working life and stressing the positive (negative) consequences implied for future beneﬁts. Of
course, the information that it is possible to get from this question is very diﬀerent with respect to
preliminary versions, and a more quantitative approach might be desirable in a stand-alone survey.
7.2 Improvements of survey organization
The training of interviewers is particularly important. In particular, interviewers should be intro-
duced in details to the current rules of the social security system. In addition, they should be
asked to ﬁll in a special module describing the perceived characteristics of the respondents and the
interview.
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50Table 1: Distribution of the sample by gender and age group.
Bulgaria Colombia
Age group Men Women Total Men Women Total
15—19 20 20 40 48 1 2
20—29 38 32 70 16 19 35
30—44 45 68 113 26 36 62
45—54 48 60 108 15 24 39
55—64 28 30 58 10 11 21
65+ 16 23 39 44 8
Total 195 233 428 75 102 177
Table 2: Age structure of the sample and population age structure from the U.N. Population
Division data for 2005 (UN 2005).
Sample UN 2005
Age group Men Women Total Men Women Total
Bulgaria
15—19 10.3 8.6 9.3 8.3 7.3 7.8
20—29 19.5 13.7 16.4 18.2 16.0 17.0
30—44 23.1 29.2 26.4 25.4 23.1 24.2
45—54 24.6 25.8 25.2 17.0 16.6 16.8
55—64 14.4 12.9 13.6 14.4 15.1 14.8
65+ 8.2 9.9 9.1 16.8 22.0 19.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Colombia
15—19 5.3 7.8 6.8 14.3 13.1 13.7
20—29 21.3 18.6 19.8 25.8 24.2 25.0
30—44 34.7 35.3 35.0 31.1 31.2 31.2
45—54 20.0 23.5 22.0 14.1 14.7 14.4
55—64 13.3 10.8 11.9 8.1 8.6 8.4
65+ 5.3 3.9 4.5 6.6 8.1 7.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
51Table 3: Distribution of the sample by gender, age group and schooling attainments (I: primary,
II: secondary, III: tertiary).
Men Women Total
Age group II I I I I T o t a lII I I I I T o t a lII I I I I T o t a l
Bulgaria
15—19 14 6 0 20 15 5 0 20 29 11 0 40
20—29 52 2 1 1 3 832 18 3 284 31 9 7 0
30—44 72 7 1 1 4 543 2 3 2 6 8 11 59 43 113
45—54 63 48 4 853 9 1 6 6 0 11 73 24 108
55—64 21 2 1 4 2 831 89 3 053 02 3 5 8
65+ 58 2 1 5 12 8 3 23 17 16 5 38
Total 39 109 46 194 42 123 68 233 81 232 114 427
Colombia
15—19 22 0 4 44 0 8 660 1 2
20—29 11 14 1 651 04 1 962 1 8 3 5
30—44 31 2 1 1 2 661 4 1 6 3 692 62 7 6 2
45—54 45 6 1 5 71 16 2 4 11 16 12 39
55—64 15 4 1 0 65 0 1 1 71 0 4 2 1
65+ 31 0 4 31 0 4 620 8
Total 14 36 25 75 31 45 26 102 45 81 51 177
Table 4: Distribution of the sample by gender, age group and labor force status.
Men Women Total
Age group Empl Unemp Out Total Empl Unemp Out Total Empl Unemp Out Total
Bulgaria
15—19 0 2 17 19 4 2 14 20 4 4 31 39
20—29 27 5 6 38 18 7 7 32 45 12 13 70
30—44 38 4 3 45 60 5 3 68 98 9 6 113
45—54 43 4 1 48 53 6 1 60 96 10 2 108
55—64 20 0 8 28 27 1 2 30 47 1 10 58
65+ 3 0 13 16 8 0 15 23 11 0 28 39
Total 131 15 48 194 170 21 42 233 301 36 90 427
Colombia
15—19 00 4 4 10 7 8 1 0 11 12
20—29 13 2 1 16 16 0 3 19 29 2 4 35
30—44 25 1 0 26 25 1 10 36 50 2 10 62
45—54 12 1 2 15 18 0 6 24 30 1 8 39
55—64 90 1 1 0 70 4 1 1 16 0 5 21
65+ 10 3 4 00 4 4 10 7 8
Total 60 4 11 75 67 1 34 102 127 5 45 177
52Table 5: Estimated logistic regressions for labor force status (* denotes asymptotic p-values between
5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Bulgaria Colombia
Variables Active Empl Unemp Active Empl Unemp
Female 0.670** 0.276 0.233 -1.508** -0.888** -1.619
Age 15—19 -3.849** -3.595** 1.899** -4.268** -3.833**
Age 20—29 -1.281** -1.207** 1.049** 0.361 0.098 0.660
Age 45—54 1.250 0.353 0.002 -0.224 -0.152 -0.133
Age 55—64 -1.381** -0.458 -1.466 -0.520 -0.248
Age 65+ -3.714** -2.599** -3.889** -3.358**
Lower education -0.214 -0.280 0.468 -0.600 -0.624 0.660
Higher education 1.178** 1.090** -0.944* -0.246 -0.263 0.448
Constant 2.275** 1.450** -2.308** 2.918** 2.224** -2.986**
No. obs. 427 428 326 177 177 114
Log-likelihood -130.6 -185.0 -100.9 -71.4 -82.1 -19.0
Pseudo R2 0.406 0.289 0.109 0.288 0.221 0.074
χ2 (age) 76.81** 69.70** 14.06** 22.58** 19.43** 0.53
χ2 (educ) 7.09** 11.00** 4.95* 1.36 1.67 0.31
Table 6: Distribution of the sample by gender, age group and type of employment (C denotes
contribution to a pension fund, NC denotes lack of contribution to a pension fund).
Men Women Total
Self Empl Tot Self Empl Tot Self Empl Tot
Age CN C CN C CN C CN C CN C CN C
Bulgaria
15—29 0.0 4.0 80.0 16.0 100.0 14.3 9.5 57.1 19.0 100.0 6.5 6.5 69.6 17.4 100.0
30—54 25.3 3.8 63.3 7.6 100.0 10.0 4.5 82.7 2.7 100.0 16.4 4.2 74.6 4.8 100.0
55+ 0.0 13.0 82.6 4.3 100.0 5.7 20.0 57.1 17.1 100.0 3.4 17.2 67.2 12.1 100.0
Total 15.7 5.5 70.1 8.7 100.0 9.6 8.4 74.1 7.8 100.0 12.3 7.2 72.4 8.2 100.0
Colombia
15—29 7.7 23.1 38.5 30.8 100.0 29.4 23.5 29.4 17.6 100.0 20.0 23.3 33.3 23.3 100.0
30—54 8.1 32.4 51.4 8.1 100.0 16.7 38.1 35.7 9.5 100.0 12.7 35.4 43.0 8.9 100.0
55+ 30.0 30.0 40.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 85.7 14.3 0.0 100.0 17.6 52.9 29.4 0.0 100.0
Total 11.7 30.0 46.7 11.7 100.0 18.2 39.4 31.8 10.6 100.0 15.1 34.9 38.9 11.1 100.0
53Table 7: Estimated logistic regressions for informal employment (* denotes asymptotic p-values
between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Bulgaria Colombia
Variables Self Nocontrib Second Self Nocontrib Second
Female -0.257 0.143 0.386 0.757** 0.173 -0.397
Age 15—19 1.000 1.434
Age 20—29 -1.076* 1.312** -0.491 -0.091 -0.085 -1.341
Age 45—54 -0.093 0.368 -0.038 0.357 0.613 0.152
Age 55—64 -0.072 1.269** 0.006 1.029 0.089
Age 65+ 0.334 3.500** -0.720
Lower education 0.381 1.929** 0.291 0.334 1.246** -0.019
Higher education -0.610* -0.469 0.420 -0.193 -1.433** -0.083
Constant -1.030** -2.813** -2.181** -0.574 -0.221 -1.770**
No. obs. 301 293 297 125 124 109
Log-likelihood -141.6 -100.5 -115.3 -82.0 -72.4 -34.3
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.201 0.017 0.054 0.152 0.038
χ2 (age) 4.89 20.91** 1.11 3.40 1.71 1.73
χ2 (educ) 4.46 19.89** 1.32 0.89 17.43** 0.01
Table 8: Estimated logistic regressions for informal employment of employees (* denotes asymptotic
p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Bulgaria Colombia
Variables Nocontract Smallf Nocontract Smallf
Female -1.037 0.810* -0.154 0.766
Age 20—29 0.795 1.994** 2.247* -0.012
Age 45—54 -0.739 -0.329 2.195* -0.111
Age 55—64 0.667 1.061* 2.792* 0.171
Age 65+ 0.377
Lower education 3.172** 0.826 1.309 0.933
Higher education -0.056 -1.933*
Constant -3.382** -2.935** -2.754** -1.536**
No. obs. 140 199 39 62
Log-likelihood -23.1 -73.0 -20.4 -26.0
Pseudo R2 0.309 0.117 0.179 0.146
χ2 (age) 2.09 16.53** 4.34 0.04
χ2 (educ) 14.16** 1.24 1.98 4.98*
54Table 9: Estimated log-earnings regressions (* denotes asymptotic p-values between 5 and 10
percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Bulgaria Colombia
Variables All All Employees All All Employees
Female -0.137** -0.093* -0.145* -0.157 -0.234* -0.093
Age 0.004 0.007** 0.005 0.010 0.010** 0.017**
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Lower education -0.360** -0.496** -0.504** -0.544** -0.643** -0.735**
Higher education 0.226** 0.268** 0.248** 1.238** 1.080** 1.037**
Self-employed 0.211** -0.110
Not contributing to OAI 0.269** 0.037 -0.489** -0.324
Working without a contract 0.692** -0.126
Employee of a small ﬁrm -0.320** -0.232
Constant 0.482** 0.398** 0.461** 1.335** 1.534** 1.562**
No. obs. 254 248 165 118 118 62
MAE 0.356 0.344 0.317 0.859 0.823 0.387
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.130 0.142 0.185 0.219 0.519
χ2 (age) 1.01 3.85** 0.79 0.70 2.18 5.81**
χ2 (educ) 12.98** 27.60** 9.17** 23.87** 45.25** 55.99**
Table 10: Estimated logistic regressions for satisfaction with the main job (* denotes asymptotic
p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Overall Satisfaction
satisfaction with SS beneﬁts
Variables Bulgaria Colombia Bulgaria Colombia
Female 0.025 -0.279 0.235 -0.081
Age 20—29 -0.883** -0.535 -0.484 -0.736
Age 45—54 -0.210 -1.374** 0.110 0.739
Age 55—64 -0.234 0.237 -0.100 -1.189
Age 65+ 1.439 -0.837
Lower education -0.646 -0.135 -1.096** -1.899
Higher education -0.401 -0.193 -0.034 -0.866
Constant 1.211** 1.909** 0.699* -0.484
No. obs. 236 125 204 64
Log-likelihood -141.2 -64.3 -127.2 -32.4
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.067 0.030 0.071
χ2 (age) 6.67 7.80* 2.55 2.97
χ2 (educ) 2.73 0.15 4.18 3.02
55Table 11: Mean and percentiles of subjective survival probabilities by gender and age group, Bul-
garia.
Age 70 Age 80 Age 90
Age group Mean q25 q50 q75 Mean q25 q50 q75 Mean q25 q50 q75
Men
15-19 90.0 80 90 100 5 5 . 05 05 56 02 5 . 02 02 53 0
20-29 66.8 50 65 100 4 0 . 01 53 56 018.3 0 8 30
30-44 4 4 . 23 05 05 021.9 0 20 40 6.0 0 0 10
45-54 4 7 . 31 05 08 027.3 0 20 50 8.4 0 0 20
55-64 5 3 . 53 05 08 022.4 0 10 50 8.2 0 0 20
65+ 70.0 10 100 100 58.2 50 50 100 22.7 0 10 20
Total 5 2 . 33 05 08 030.7 0 30 50 11.3 0 0 20
Women
15-19 92.0 100 100 100 5 4 . 04 05 05 010.0 0 10 20
20-29 6 1 . 45 06 08 03 9 . 22 04 05 011.7 0 0 20
30-44 4 5 . 53 05 06 020.6 6 20 30 3 . 9002
45-54 4 9 . 63 05 06 02 7 . 41 02 04 0 9.5 0 0 10
55-64 5 3 . 03 05 08 03 3 . 12 03 05 0 6.2 0 0 10
65+ 71.4 40 80 100 4 9 . 32 05 06 017.6 0 10 20
Total 5 2 . 84 05 07 03 0 . 51 02 04 5 8.4 0 0 10
Total
15-19 91.4 80 100 100 5 4 . 34 05 06 014.3 0 20 20
20-29 63.8 50 60 100 3 9 . 52 04 05 014.7 0 3 20
30-44 4 5 . 03 05 05 021.1 0 20 30 4 . 7005
45-54 4 8 . 62 05 07 027.3 5 20 40 9.0 0 0 10
55-64 5 3 . 23 05 08 028.8 5 20 50 7.0 0 0 10
65+ 71.0 40 90 100 5 3 . 24 05 06 019.8 0 10 20
Total 5 2 . 63 05 08 03 0 . 61 03 05 0 9.6 0 0 10
56Table 12: Mean and percentiles of subjective life expectancy by gender and age group, Colombia.
Agegroup Mean q25 q50 q75
Men
30-44 7 6 . 77 07 08 0
45-54 7 8 . 77 08 08 5
55-64 7 3 . 98 08 08 0
65+ 8 8 . 88 38 89 5
Total 7 7 . 67 08 08 5
Women
30-44 7 4 . 07 07 08 0
45-54 7 7 . 27 08 08 0
55-64 7 5 . 07 07 58 0
65+ 8 5 . 08 38 58 8
Total 7 5 . 77 07 58 0
Total
30-44 7 5 . 17 07 08 0
45-54 7 7 . 87 08 08 0
55-64 7 4 . 47 08 08 0
65+ 8 6 . 98 38 59 0
Total 7 6 . 57 08 08 0
Table 13: Estimated logistic regressions for optimism about life duration (* denotes asymptotic
p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Bulgaria Colombia
Variables Age 70 Age 80 Age 90
Female -0.106 -0.115 -0.737 -0.577
Age 15—19 2.291**
Age 20—29 1.354** 1.386** 16.799**
Age 45—54 0.638* 0.705 14.960 -0.184
Age 55—64 0.853** 0.904 -0.946
Age 65+ 1.753** 2.579** 17.270** 2.196**
Lower education -0.361 -0.774 -0.376 1.371**
Higher education -0.089 0.261 1.010 0.814
Constant -1.090** -2.716** -19.228** -1.738**
No. obs. 269 284 238 128
Log-likelihood -168.3 -106.4 -26.9 -56.5
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.092 0.230 0.143
χ2 (age) 14.81** 19.88** 241.81** 8.11**
χ2 (educ) 0.72 2.67 2.03 4.81*
57Table 14: Mean and percentiles of subjective full-time work probabilities by gender and age group,
Bulgaria.
Age 50 Age 60 Age 70
Age group Mean q25 q50 q75 Mean q25 q50 q75 Mean q25 q50 q75
Men
15-19 100.0 100 100 100 75.0 50 75 100 2 0 . 01 02 03 0
20-29 81.0 65 100 100 6 0 . 54 05 59 511.5 0 0 20
30-44 84.0 80 95 100 5 5 . 73 05 07 014.5 0 3 20
45-54 85.2 100 100 100 68.3 50 70 100 14.2 0 0 20
55-64 .... 63.3 40 70 100 5 . 3000
65+ .... ....0 . 0000
Total 84.0 80 100 100 62.4 50 65 100 12.1 0 0 20
Women
15-19 100.0 100 100 100 4 0 . 03 05 05 0 0 . 0000
20-29 83.5 80 100 100 4 8 . 12 05 08 011.0 0 0 20
30-44 80.0 50 100 100 4 8 . 62 05 08 0 6.7 0 0 10
45-54 91.3 100 100 100 5 8 . 03 05 59 0 6 . 3000
55-64 .... 46.7 0 40 100 8.7 0 0 10
65+ .... .... 10.0 0 0 10
Total 84.2 80 100 100 5 1 . 22 05 08 0 7 . 5005
Total
15-19 100.0 100 100 100 5 0 . 03 05 07 0 5.7 0 0 10
20-29 82.4 80 100 100 5 3 . 52 05 08 011.2 0 0 20
30-44 81.4 65 100 100 5 1 . 12 55 07 5 9.5 0 0 10
45-54 88.4 100 100 100 62.2 40 70 100 9.6 0 0 10
55-64 .... 52.9 5 55 100 7 . 4003
65+ .... ....7 . 5005
Total 84.1 80 100 100 5 5 . 53 05 09 0 9.3 0 0 10
58Table 15: Mean and percentiles of expected retirement age by gender and age group, Colombia.
Agegroup Mean q25 q50 q75
Men
30-44 6 0 . 85 86 06 5
45-54 6 4 . 16 06 57 0
55-64 6 0 . 16 56 57 0
65+ 8 0 . 08 08 08 0
Total 6 2 . 06 06 57 0
Women
30-44 5 7 . 85 06 06 0
45-54 6 3 . 45 86 06 5
55-64 6 4 . 06 06 16 5
Total 6 0 . 65 66 06 1
Total
30-44 5 9 . 35 56 06 0
45-54 6 3 . 76 06 07 0
55-64 6 1 . 86 06 56 9
65+ 8 0 . 08 08 08 0
Total 6 1 . 35 86 06 5
Table 16: Estimated logistic regressions for optimism about working life duration (* denotes as-
ymptotic p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Bulgaria Colombia
Variables Age 50 Age 60 Age 70
Female -0.296 -0.540* -2.176** -1.175**
Age 15—19 0.147
Age 20—29 -0.152 0.246 0.059
Age 45—54 0.590 0.584* 2.394** 1.681**
Age 55—64 0.302 2.930**
Lower education -1.057** -1.609** -1.492*
Higher education 0.041 0.182 2.261** 1.268**
Constant 1.633** 0.093 -4.685** -1.219**
No. obs. 175 246 188 94
Log-likelihood -84.4 -159.8 -25.1 -47.3
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.062 0.241 0.243
χ2 (age) 1.78 3.25 6.06** 14.46**
χ2 (educ) 4.48 11.86** 6.16** 10.58**
59Table 17: Mean and percentiles of expected replacement rates by gender and age group, Bulgaria.
Age group Mean q25 q50 q75
Men
30-44 6 0 . 04 05 07 0
45-54 5 5 . 24 05 07 0
55-64 5 5 . 04 55 06 0
65+ 6 0 . 06 06 06 0
Total 5 6 . 04 05 07 0
Women
30-44 5 4 . 44 05 06 0
45-54 6 5 . 45 06 08 0
55-64 6 2 . 04 06 08 0
65+ 5 0 . 05 05 05 0
Total 6 2 . 04 86 07 0
Total
30-44 5 5 . 74 05 07 0
45-54 6 1 . 84 75 57 3
55-64 5 9 . 84 06 08 0
65+ 5 5 . 05 05 56 0
Total 6 0 . 04 55 07 0
Table 18: Estimated regressions for expected replacement rate (* denotes asymptotic p-values
between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent; Pseudo R2 is McKelvey
and Zavoina’s R2).
Variables Bulgaria Colombia
Female 3.642 3.280 1.691 1.679
Age 0.182 0.505**
Years of contribution 0.132 0.420**
Lower education -8.256 -6.967 -15.303** -12.076**
Higher education -6.856* -6.377 2.454 0.614
Constant 56.200** 57.068** 64.598** 70.696**
No. obs. 109 107 68 68
Log-likelihood -473.0 -464.8 -125.8 -126.2
R2 0.039 0.034
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.147
χ2 (educ) 1.72 1.41 9.11** 4.8*
60Table 19: Estimated logistic regressions for optimism about future quality of life (* denotes asymp-
totic p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Next 5 years Post-retirement
quality of life quality of life
Variables Bulgaria Colombia Bulgaria Colombia
Female -0.659** 0.613 -0.628* -0.000
Age 15—19 2.420**
Age 20—29 1.235** 0.890*
Age 45—54 -0.285 0.110 -0.457 -0.199
Age 55—64 -0.812** -0.909* -1.161 -1.003
Age 65+ -2.479** 1.534 -1.185 -0.344
Lower education -0.379 -0.883* -0.207 -0.471
Higher education -0.150 -0.354
Constant 0.303 0.853* -0.861** 0.662
No. obs. 302 130 213 95
Log-likelihood -177.1 -75.7 -96.6 -63.7
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.066 0.074 0.027
χ2 (age) 36.12** 5.91 10.31** 2.71
χ2 (educ) 0.95 2.96 2.24 1.03
Table 20: Estimated logistic regressions for optimism about employment risks (* denotes asymptotic
p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Variables Bulgaria Colombia A Colombia B
Female 0.122 -0.375 -1.252*
Age 20—29 -0.643
Age 45—54 0.106 0.910 0.520
Age 55—64 -0.038 -0.566
Age 65+ -1.390*
Lower education -0.350 -1.130 0.655
Higher education 0.262 -0.326 0.325
Constant 0.703* 0.706 1.022
No. obs. 184 39 48
Log-likelihood -114.0 -24.8 -28.1
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.045 0.080
χ2 (age) 5.58 1.35 1.25
χ2 (educ) 1.39 1.15 0.55
61Table 21: Estimated logistic regressions for optimism about health risks (* denotes asymptotic
p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Illness Accident
Variables Bulgaria Colombia A Colombia B Bulgaria Colombia A Colombia B
Female -0.001 -0.466 0.200 0.399 0.067 -0.404
Age 15—19 1.088 1.112
Age 20—29 1.850** 1.048**
Age 45—54 0.880** -0.846 -0.284 0.812** 0.171 -0.743
Age 55—64 -0.069 -0.096 0.719 0.995 -0.728
Age 65+ -0.774* -4.046** -0.056 -3.346**
Lower education -0.528 2.587** -0.855** 2.691** 1.247
Higher education -0.371 1.665** -0.999 -0.435 1.270* -0.585
Constant 1.030** 0.466 2.029** 0.952** -0.460 2.079**
No. obs. 300 53 48 298 64 61
Log-likelihood -150.3 -28.2 -22.3 -142.5 -34.7 -28.5
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.183 0.038 0.056 0.180 0.058
χ2 (age) 21.70** 5.86* 0.11 8.93 6.38* 1.07
χ2 (educ) 2.34 7.33** 1.45 4.90* 7.80** 2.31
Table 22: Estimated logistic regressions for impatience and risk aversion (* denotes asymptotic
p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Impatience Risk aversion
Variables Bulgaria Colombia Bulgaria Colombia
Female -0.016 0.274 0.180 -0.145
Age 15—19 -0.168 -0.185
Age 20—29 0.219 0.254
Age 45—54 0.198 -0.664 0.811** 0.056
Age 55—64 -0.102 0.284 0.651* 1.025
Age 65+ 0.148 0.309 0.569 -0.463
Lower education 0.848** -1.169** 0.471 -1.008*
Higher education -0.127 -0.595 0.013 -0.540
Constant 0.180 1.599** -0.245 1.832**
No. obs. 303 125 303 128
Log-likelihood -201.6 -67.2 -200.2 -61.4
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.055 0.025 0.049
χ2 (age) 1.11 3.12 8.25 2.18
χ2 (educ) 5.83* 4.56 1.73 2.98
62Table 23: Estimated logistic regressions for government responsibility for social security, and for
preference for PAYG pension scheme (* denotes asymptotic p-values between 5 and 10 percent, **
denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Government responsibility Preference for PAYG
Variables Bulgaria (OAI) Bulgaria (SDI) Colombia Bulgaria Colombia
Female 0.216 -0.461 -0.083 0.026 -0.049
Age 15—19 -2.372** -1.058 0.220 -0.484 0.499
Age 20—29 0.092 -0.346 -0.365 0.553
Age 45—54 -0.073 0.219 0.003 0.297 0.248
Age 55—64 -0.071 0.808 0.551 0.200 1.262**
Age 65+ 0.818* 0.801
Lower education 1.752* 0.969 -0.281 0.337 -0.122
Higher education -0.720** 1.510 -0.715* 0.145 -0.140
Constant 1.699** 2.832** 0.850** -1.529** -1.784**
No. obs. 272 226 162 292 169
Log-likelihood -116.4 -38.6 -104.4 -151.6 -79.5
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.059 0.027 0.021 0.030
χ2 (age) 6.17 1.53 2.15 5.19 4.56
χ2 (educ) 8.99** 2.44 3.34 0.72 0.11
Table 24: Estimated logistic regressions for agreement with diﬀerent arguments for paying social
security contributions, and for optimism about future generosity of the social security system (*
denotes asymptotic p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5
percent).
Solidarity argument Economic argument Future generosity
social security system
Variables Bulgaria Colombia Bulgaria Colombia Bulgaria Colombia
Female 0.869 -1.409* -0.023 0.369 -0.345 -0.882*
Age 15—19 1.046 -0.532 1.095 -0.099
Age 20—29 -0.635 -0.480 -1.383** 0.267 0.258 0.391
Age 45—54 0.813 0.935 -0.020 0.337 -0.341 0.159
Age 55—64 0.695 -0.318 0.216 0.972 -0.242 -0.093
Age 65+ -4.009** 0.795* -0.526 0.288
Lower education -0.949 1.849 -0.641 0.886* -0.386 1.180**
Higher education 0.091 -1.078 -0.141 -0.756** 0.044 -0.884
Constant 2.702** 3.933** -0.367 0.206 -0.243 -1.591**
No. obs. 262 161 298 171 288 164
Log-likelihood -41.9 -36.6 -185.9 -103.6 -186.3 -62.0
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.189 0.052 0.079 0.019 0.092
χ2 (age) 3.11 10.03** 15.81** 4.31 5.10 0.60
χ2 (educ) 1.79 4.80* 2.61 9.89** 1.06 9.04**
63Table 25: Estimated logistic regressions for willingness to pay (WTP) higher or lower contributions
(Bulgaria only), and for preference for the old age insurance (* denotes asymptotic p-values between
5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
WTP Old age insurance
Higher Lower
Variables Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Colombia
Female 0.259 -0.647 -0.124 0.183
Age 15—19
Age 20—29 -0.33 1.019* -0.783* -0.949
Age 45—54 0.221 0.294 0.361 0.111
Age 55—64 0.086 -0.333 1.220** 1.201
Age 65+ 1.551** 2.175**
Lower education -1.051** -0.943 -0.434
Higher education 0.048 -0.645 0.414 -0.414
Constant 0.013 -0.18 0.265 0.243
No. obs. 278 115 277 49
Log-likelihood -182.4 -69.6 -163.6 -32.0
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.063 0.088 0.058
χ2 (age) 10.78** 4.27 24.49** 3.26
χ2 (educ) 6.51** 3.18 3.53 0.41
Table 26: Estimated logistic regressions for satisfaction with the main job (* denotes asymptotic
p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Overall Satisfaction
satisfaction with SS beneﬁts
Variables Bulgaria Colombia Bulgaria Colombia
Female -0.050 -0.227 0.190 -0.120
Age 20—29 -0.606 -0.545 -0.203 -0.535
Age 45—54 -0.081 -1.287** 0.185 0.845
Age 55—64 -0.101 0.237 0.143 -1.353
Age 65+ 2.083* 0.360
Lower education -0.550 -0.218 -0.938 -1.580
Higher education -0.531 -0.264 -0.266 -1.246
Not contributing to OAI -0.962** -0.017 -2.319** -1.926*
Constant 1.387** 1.931** 0.903** -0.126
No. obs. 231 124 200 64
Log-likelihood -133.4 -63.4 -116.2 -30.5
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.060 0.084 0.124
χ2 (age) 5.99 6.63* 0.76 2.96
χ2 (educ) 3.11 0.30 2.66 3.30
64Table 27: Estimated regressions for expected replacement rate (* denotes asymptotic p-values
between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent; Pseudo R2 is McKelvey
and Zavoina’s R2).
Variables Bulgaria Colombia
Female 3.438 2.379
Age 0.175 0.552**
Lower education -7.697 -9.575*
Higher education -7.468* -1.214
Not contributing to OAI -3.029 -15.154**
Constant 57.366** 70.241**
No. obs. 107 68
Log-likelihood -463.4 -119.9
R2 0.045
Pseudo R2 0.284
χ2 (educ) 1.94 2.82
Table 28: Estimated logistic regressions for optimism about post-retirement quality of life (* denotes
asymptotic p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Variables Bulgaria Colombia
Female -0.480 0.020
Age 20—29 0.923*
Age 45—54 -0.545 -0.180
Age 55—64 -1.188 -1.003
Lower education -0.508 -0.311
Higher education -0.156 -0.523
Not contributing to OAI -1.969* -0.159
Constant -0.898** 0.730
No. obs. 208 95
Log-likelihood -90.7 -63.6
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.028
χ2 (age) 10.12** 2.70
χ2 (educ) 0.45 1.13
65Table 29: Estimated logistic regressions for optimism about health risks (* denotes asymptotic
p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Illness Accident
Variables Bulgaria Colombia A Colombia B Bulgaria Colombia A Colombia B
Female 0.137 -0.026 -0.320 0.701* 0.572 -0.353
Age 20—29 1.583** 0.981*
Age 45—54 0.932** -0.759 -0.207 0.903** 0.555 -0.454
Age 55—64 0.039 -0.222 0.775 0.965 -1.390
Age 65+ -0.089 0.603
Lower education -0.693 -1.016* 1.407
Higher education -0.739* 1.563* -0.487 -0.813** 1.033 -1.742
Not contributing to OAI -1.091** -0.221 0.521 -0.875* -0.709 -1.536
Constant 1.394** 0.103 1.767* 1.165** -0.599 3.215**
No. obs. 230 32 38 229 38 48
Log-likelihood -106.9 -19.1 -17.7 -100.6 -23.6 -21.6
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.114 0.025 0.091 0.097 0.119
χ2 (age) 9.33* 0.74 0.05 5.63 1.00 1.14
χ2 (educ) 4.24 3.08* 0.20 5.53* 1.97 3.73
Table 30: Estimated logistic regressions for preference for PAYG pension scheme (* denotes as-
ymptotic p-values between 5 and 10 percent, ** denotes asymptotic p-values below 5 percent).
Variables Bulgaria Colombia
Female 0.579 -0.572
Age 20—29 -0.633 0.490
Age 45—54 0.286 0.571
Age 55—64 -0.255 1.679**
Age 65+ -0.552
Lower education -0.179 0.530
Higher education 0.150 -0.091
Not contributing to OAI -0.053 -0.984*
Constant -1.986** -1.456**
No. obs. 223 122
Log-likelihood -99.3 -52.6
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.087
χ2 (age) 2.49 5.34
χ2 (educ) 0.27 0.74
66A Main socio-economic indicators for Bulgaria and Colombia
Table 31: Main socio-economic indicators
Bulgaria Colombia
Economy
GDP per capita (current US$)
1 2351.44 2101.00
GDP per capita (PPP US$)
1 7840.03 6974.85
GDP growth (average annual growth 1990-2000) -1.8 2.8
GDP growth (average annual growth 2000-2004) 4.8 2.9
Labor
Labor force participation rate, female (% ages 15—64) 53.3 65.0
Labor force participation rate, male (% ages 15-64) 63.0 85.3
Unemployment (% of total labor force) 13.7 14.2
Employment in agriculture, female (% of total employment) 8.0 8.0
Employment in industry, female (% of total employment) 29.0 17.0
Employment in services, female (% of total employment) 64.0 75.0
Employment in agriculture, male (% of total employment) 12.0 31.0
Employment in industry, male (% of total employment) 37.0 21.0
Employment in services, male (% of total employment) 51.0 49.0
Shadow economy (% of GDP, average 1990/1991)
2 29.4 33.4
Shadow economy (% of GDP, average 1994/1995)
2 33.2 36.2
Shadow economy (% of GDP, average 1999/2000)
2 36.9 39.1
Self-employment (% of total employment)
3 14.9 50.9
Tax policies
Tax revenue collected by central government (% of GDP) 22.3 13.8
Highest marginal tax rate (Individual %) 29.0 35.0
Highest marginal tax rate (Corporate %) 20.0 37.0
Social security
Pension contributors (% of labor force) 64.0 20.7
Public expenditure on pensions (% of GDP) 8.9 1.1
Average pension (% of per capita income) 39.3 72.2
Contribution towards OASDI, if social insurance only (% of earnings)
4 23.0 15.5
Contribution towards OASDI, if individual account (% of earnings)
4 23.0 18.5
Minimum age for OA social insurance pension, men (2006)
4 63.0 60.0
Minimum age for OA social insurance pension, women (2006)
4 58.5 55.0
Minimum years of contributions for OA social insurance pension, men (minimum age)
4 37.0 20.2
Minimum years of contributions for OA social insurance pension, women (minimum age)
4 33.5 20.2
OA social insurance beneﬁt with minimum age and contribution, men (% of earnings)
4 37.0 80.0
OA social insurance beneﬁt with minimum age and contribution, women (% of earnings)
4 33.5 80.0
Source: World Development Indicators 2004; (1) IMF World Economic Outlook 2004; (2) Schneider (2005);
(3) ILO LABORSTA 2004; (4) ISSA Social Security Worldwide (2006)
67B Key features of the social security systems of Bulgaria and
Colombia
The social security system has diﬀerent features in Bulgaria and in Colombia. In Bulgaria, until
2002, the system was based on social insurance only and coverage was mandatory for all employed
individuals. Starting in 2002, a second pillar was introduced. After this reform, an individual
account program is also mandatory for workers born after December 31, 1959. In Colombia,
insurance is mandatory for all workers, who can choose either the social insurance or individual
account system. It is possible to switch program every three years.
In Bulgaria, contributions towards the old age pension are 23.0 percent of earnings for both
employees and self-employed. In Colombia, they are 15.5 percent if the social insurance is chosen,
and 18.5 percent if the individual account system is chosen.
For old-age pension eligibility in Bulgaria, the minimum age requirement is 63 years for men
and 58 years and 6 months for women. The age limit for women is increasing by 6 months every
year until 2009, when it will reach age 60. For the social insurance program, the sum of age and
years of contributions must be at least 100 for men and 92 for women. The social insurance old-age
pension beneﬁt is 1 percent of taxable income for each year of insurance coverage.
In Colombia, the minimum age to receive the old-age pension is 60 for men and 55 for women,
although it will increase to 62 and 57 respectively in 2014. The requirement in terms of contributions
for the social insurance beneﬁt is 1050 weeks, although it is increasing by 25 weeks each year, up
to 1300 in 2015. For the individual account program, the accumulated capital must be suﬃcient
to purchase an annuity greater than 110 percent the minimum wage. The social insurance old-
age pension beneﬁt is equal to 55—65 percent of monthly wage, plus 1.5 percent for each 50-week
contribution period, up to 80 percent. For the individual account system, the beneﬁt depends on
accrued interest.
In Bulgaria, sickness and maternity beneﬁts are paid to eligible workers with at least 6 months
of insurance coverage. In Colombia, the coverage must be of at least 4 weeks for sickness beneﬁts
and 9 months for maternity beneﬁts.
For work injury beneﬁts, there are no qualifying conditions both in Bulgaria and Colombia.
In Bulgaria, eligibility for the unemployment beneﬁt requires at least 9 months of insurance
coverage. The beneﬁt is 60 percent of average earnings in the last 9 months, and duration of
the beneﬁt depends on the length of the coverage period, up to 12 months. In Colombia, the
unemployment beneﬁt is equal to 1 monthly wage for each year of employment.
68C The basic questionnaire
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Summary Findings
There is a wide agreement on the fact that a large informal economy
leaves many individuals without social protection and reduces
government’s tax revenue and social security contributions. However,
it remains an open question what really drives informality, namely
whether workers are simply trapped out of the formal sector or, at least
some of them, choose it because it offers better alternatives than a
formal job. The policy implications are clearly different in the two cases.
In order to shed light on this important issue, we propose a household
survey instrument to assess the links between informality and social
protection. It can be implemented either through a stand-alone survey
or by adding a specific module to an existing general survey such
as the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study. After
describing the main survey instrument, we present the results of two
pilot surveys, carried out in Bulgaria and Colombia, to test the
effectiveness of the questionnaire and improve its design.
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